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1. INTRODUCTION
Years of thought, several volumes of text, and dozens of articles such as
this one have been dedicated to the American vice presidency.' In fact,
most of the literature on this topic was produced in the last half century.2
While each work has had its own particular focus and purpose, collectively
there have been several dominant themes: individual Vice Presidents and
their contributions (or lack thereof) to the office;3  constitutional
amendments and their effects on the vice presidency;4 the state of the vice
presidency at a certain point in history;5 and the evolution of the vice
presidency over time.6 Almost every work contains at least a brief
discussion of the position's origins, but most simply repeat as a truism the
conventional wisdom that the ultimate design of the vice presidency was
borrowed from the state constitutions of the 1770s and 1780s, particularly
the New York Constitution.7 While this is an accurate description of the
original design of the Federal Constitution, drafted in 1787 at the
Constitutional Convention and subsequently ratified in 1788, it is
nonetheless incomplete. Even those scholars who have delved below the
surface on this matter have failed to fully document the manifold
comparisons and differences between the early state constitutions and the
ultimate design of the vice presidency.
Part II of this Article describes the connection between the early state
constitutions drafted in the decade preceding the Constitutional Convention
and the Federal Constitution, paying particular attention to the vice
presidency and its state counterparts.8 To accomplish this, the discussion
begins with a general comparison between the earlier drafted state
constitutions and the text of the Federal Constitution, including its
1. See, e.g., JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY (1982)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, MODERN V.P.]; IRVING G. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY
(1956); BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY (1968); Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision-
A Missed Chance to Straighten Out Some Muddled Issues, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 185; Joel K.
Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505 (1995)
[hereinafter Goldstein, Constitutional V.P.]; Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78
VA. L. REV. 913 (1992); Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811
(2005); Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1703 (1988).
2. See supra note 1.
3. See CAROLE CHANDLER WALDRUP, VICE PRESIDENTS: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE 45 MEN WHO
HAVE HELD THE SECOND HIGHEST OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).
4. See GOLDSTEIN, MODERN V.P., supra note 1; BAYH, supra note 1.
5. See Amar, supra note 1; Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1.
6. See Albert, supra note 1.
7. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part 11.
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companion Bill of Rights adopted in 1791.9 This is an important foundation
from which to start because most law students (and probably many lawyers
and professors) are unaware of the true and most fundamental source of the
Federal Constitution's text-the collective early state constitutions.' 0
Indeed, a simple review of several popular constitutional law textbooks and
secondary materials quickly proves that law students are much more likely
to be taught and to believe that the delegates at the Constitutional
Convention mainly had Montesquieu, Locke, and Hobbes on their minds and
copies of the Prohibitions Del Rey and Aristotle's Politics in their hands."
In truth what is more likely is that while these historical thinkers and
documents were indeed influential in the general design of the new
American Government, it was the individual state constitutions that were
actually the primary sources for the delegates' most important specific ideas
ultimately included in the Federal Constitution-a reality that seems to have
been "overwhelmed" ever since."2 Part II's discussion then moves to the
9. See infra notes 31-58 and accompanying text; U.S. CONST. amends. I-X. In this area, it is
appropriate to connect the Constitution and Bill of Rights because: (1) they were drafted very close
in time; (2) much of the language in the state constitutions is strikingly similar to the text of the Bill
of Rights (perhaps even more so than the text of the Constitution); and (3) several accounts of the
ratification debates in individual states reveal that ultimate ratification by several essential states
hinged on the ultimate inclusion of such rights through the amendment process. See Roger A.
Bruns, A More Perfect Union: The Creation of the U.S. Constitution, http://www.archives.gov/
national-archives-experience/charters/constitution.history.html.
10. Professor Akhil Reed Amar pointed this fact out several times during a two-week intensive
lecture and discussion class at Pepperdine University in August of 2006, and these discussions were
the impetus for this Article. The class and discussions focused on his recent book. See AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005). When asked, students in the class listed
historical events and documents and famous political theorists as the primary influences on the
Constitution's framers, but none named the several state constitutions as a primary, let alone the
most influential, source of the Constitution's form and text.
11. One popular constitutional law textbook dedicates over the first one hundred pages to many
historical persons and documents, while not one state constitution is mentioned. See DOUGLAS W.
KMIEC ET AL., THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION I-
115 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing John Winthrop, Aristotle's POLITICS, Cicero's DE LEGIBUS, Saint
Augustine, Bracton, Sir Edward Coke, Prohibitions Del Rey, Thomas Hobbes, John Milton, John
Locke's SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, The Declaration of Independence, and THE
FEDERALIST as influences on the founders). Moreover, even Professor Amar's popular
constitutional law textbook does not discuss the influence of the state constitutions on the Federal
Constitution. See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2006).
12. Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 50 (2006). Writing
about the study and interpretation of state constitutions compared to the Federal Constitution, Long
noted:
Although state constitutionalism came before the Federal Constitution in time, the federal
document has utterly overwhelmed those of the states in mainstream legal discussion.
Law schools teach entire courses on "Constitutional Law" without ever mentioning the
specific connection between the state constitutions and the sections of the
Federal Constitution that deal directly with the structure and powers of the
Vice President. 3 Clause by clause this Article analyzes the relationship
between the language describing the vice presidency included in the original
Constitution and the parallel language found in early state constitutions.1 4
This lays the necessary foundation for the proposed methodology for
analyzing several suggested changes in the vice presidency that is the
principal purpose of this Article.
Moving forward in time, Part III gives a brief description of the
evolution of the vice presidency from 1787 through the modem era."5 Any
meaningful discussion of the vice presidency would be incomplete without a
description of the constitutional changes and the distinct historical periods of
the vice presidency in order to orient the reader to a modem discussion.
Part IV introduces several prominent modem vice presidential scholars
and describes their ideas and suggestions regarding the second office. 6
Professors Richard D. Friedman, Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar stand on
the side of active change-they each believe that the vice presidency
remains a flawed office and they each propose ways in which it may be
improved.' 7 Professor Joel K. Goldstein stands on the side of common law
change'8-in essence he believes that the modem vice presidency "fulfills
well" its role in today's American Government and suggests the proposed
changes would do little to "enhance the office or [the American] system of
government."' 9  Under his "common law" concept of the modem vice
presidency, change to the office will occur naturally and over time rather
than through direct advocacy and active scholarly lobbying for change.2"
fifty constitutions complementing, and in some cases predating, the one written in
Philadelphia. Academic commentators blithely discuss constitutional verities without a
passing word for the often different situation in the states.
Id. (internal citations omitted). While this Article addresses a different topic, the comment remains
appropriate. This Article attempts to bring renewed focus to what state constitutions can bring to
discussions over the vice presidency and to limit the result of "overwhelm[ing]" state constitutions.
See id.
13. See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 65-119 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See Friedman, supra note 1; Amar & Amar, supra note 1.
18. Goldstein, Constitutional VP., supra note 1, at 560. "Common law" is law that develops
over time through the process of judges deciding cases, as opposed to natural law or positive law
(statutes or other written law). Professor Goldstein maintains that the development of the office of
Vice President that has occurred since the founding era "continues today and holds the promise of
further evolution of the office." Id. This mode of change is in direct contrast with Professor
Friedman and the Amars' suggestions for either a constitutional amendment or a more immediate
and active change process. See generally Friedman, supra note 1; Amar & Amar, supra note 1.
19. Goldstein, Constitutional VP., supra note 1, at 559.
20. Id. at 560.
970
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Where Professor Friedman and the Amars think the country must walk in the
spirit of the Constitution's Preamble and actively make changes that will
result in a more perfect vice presidency, Professor Goldstein thinks the vice
presidency will develop and evolve toward the same perfection in its own
good time.2' The purpose of the remainder of the article is to decide which
side is right from the perspective of the current state constitutions.22
Part V puts the article's proposed methodology to work. 3 The proposal
is simple: to determine whether the vice presidency needs to actively be
changed, we must go back to the basics; to wit, we must go back to the state
constitutions where the idea of the vice presidency was bom.24 The fact is
that, while the Supreme Court has highlighted the "role of States as
laboratories" several times over the past century, 5 their role as hotbeds of
experimentation began in the decade before the Constitution was even
written. Interestingly, the most prevalent scholars in the field have devoted
little time or attention to the early state constitutions' influence and impact
on the original Federal Constitution,2 6 and now they devote an equally small
amount of time and text to the modem state constitutions' potential to guide
possible changes in the form and duties of the vice presidency.27 With most
21. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. The Preamble reads:
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Id. "More perfect" is of course a goal America has always and must continue to strive for, and the
vice presidency is no exception. Which path toward perfection should be taken, however, is less
certain.
22. See infra Part V.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
25. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that a "[s]tate may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country").
26. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27. The Amars are the only scholars that appear to have performed even a perfunctory review of
state constitutions vis-a-vis this topic, and the extent of their consideration appears in one footnote:
A number of states constitutionally bind the election of their top executive officials. See
FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 5; HAW. CONST. art. 5, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 4; IND. CONST. art.
5, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. 4, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. II, § IB; MASS.
CONST. amend, art. LXXXVI; MICH. CONST. art. 5, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1;
MONT. CONST. Art. VI, § 2(2); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. V, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. I11, § la; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 4; S.D. CONST. art.
IV, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. 5, § 3. Several states bind the
elections of governor and lieutenant governor through statute. See ALASKA STAT. §
of the fifty states designing their governments in a Governor/Lieutenant
Governor model, similar to the Federal President/Vice President model, the
state constitutions seem to be the natural places to start, especially because
they are where the Framers started.28 So the first question is whether there is
a better place to look when considering any changes in the Executive Branch
of the Federal Government than to the executive branches of the state
governments? This can be quickly answered "no." 2 9 The second question,
however, is not as simple: after reviewing the fifty executive branches of the
state governments and learning from their experiences, are there any reasons
why the vice presidency should be changed? If the answer is yes, there is no
better time for change than this moment in history. If the answer is no, at
least we have answered the question for the present time.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY
A. State Constitutions as Temporal Predecessors to the Federal
Constitution
On January 5, 1776, following the recommendation of the Continental
Congress that the people of the several colonies form independent state
governments, 31 New Hampshire became the first American state to frame a
15.15.030(5) (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-204 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-181
(1958).
Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 915 n.5. This one footnote merely cited these state provisions, and
the Amars' argument did not rely on the general methodology of looking to state practices for
guidance.
28. See infra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
29. Ideals such as democracy, frequently cited by those who propose one change or another, are
theoretically wonderful but are probably too flexible to carry as much weight as their proponents
would like them to have. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 914 (looking to "theory, policy, and
history" but not to current practice). For instance, the United States is a representative democracy (a
republic) rather than a pure democracy in the mold of classic Greece. It uses an electoral college and
often requires more than a majority of votes for a certain measure to pass. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Relying solely upon the principle of democracy is a flawed
approach because it extends from the mistaken viewpoint that the United States is a democracy first
and foremost, which it is not.
30. Now is a good time in history to make any necessary changes for several reasons. First, there
is no present constitutional crisis. See Albert, supra note 1, at 896 (quoting former Senator and
Twenty-Fifth Amendment drafter in saying "do it now before there is a crisis, when you can do it
dispassionately and non-controversially"). Second, if there is a clear flaw in the American system of
government there is no reason for "inertia" to be a roadblock on the path toward improvement. See
Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 943-44. Finally, the 2008 presidential and vice presidential elections
are approaching, and a new Vice President will presumably be taking office. Changing the vice
presidency now would cause less conflict.
31. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 23 ("[T]he [Continental] Congress styled its most important
statement yet not as an 'order' or 'instruction,' but as a 'recommend[ation]' that individual colonies
adopt new governments wherever the old Crown-linked regimes had lapsed.").
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written constitution. 2 Three more states-South Carolina,33 Virginia,34 and
New Jersey35-quickly followed suit, each drafting its own constitution
before the Continental Congress formally declared American independence
on July 4, 1776.36 Eight additional states joined the ranks of independent
states with written constitutions between 1776 and 1780: Delaware (1776), 3'
Maryland (1776), 38  Pennsylvania (1776), 9  North Carolina (1776), 4°
Georgia (1777), 4 1 New York (1777),42 and Massachusetts (1780). 43 In sum,
eleven of the original thirteen colonies drafted written state constitutions
between 1776 and 1780, declaring themselves to be free and independent."
Two states, Connecticut 45  and Rhode Island, 46 continued to govern
themselves under their original colonial charters of 1662 and 1663.
Each of these thirteen newly independent states, while self-governing
under their individual state constitutions, sought immediately to loosely
unite themselves into a larger whole by ratifying the Articles of
Confederation in 1781. The Articles, purporting to bind the thirteen states
in a "perpetual Union" and "firm league of friendship," soon proved to be
unmanageable and inadequate. 48 Following several unsuccessful attempts at
32. N.H. CONST. (1776).
33. S.C. CONST. (1776). Interestingly, South Carolina drafted a second state constitution just
two years later, preempting the earlier one and still coming well before the Constitutional
Convention. S.C. CONST. (1778). Be careful to note that both constitutions are referenced in this
Article.
34. VA. CONST. (1776).
35. N.J. CONST. (1776).
36. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
37. DEL. CONST. (1776).
38. MD. CONST. (1776).
39. PA. CONST. (1776).
40. N.C. CONST. (1776).
41. GA. CONST. (1777).
42. N.Y. CONST. (1777).
43. MASS. CONST. (1780).
44. Vermont is an interesting case because it drafted two constitutions, one in 1777 and another
in 1786, but was not admitted as the fourteenth state of the Union until 1791 because both New York
and New Hampshire maintained claims over the region called Vermont until that date. See VT.
CONST. (1777); VT. CONST. (1786); 50states.com, http://www.50states.com/statehood.htm. This
Article does not consider either of the Vermont constitutions.
45. CONN. CHARTER (1662).
46. R.I. CHARTER (1663).
47. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION (1781).
48. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION pmbl.; THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. Ill; see
Bruns, supra note 9. The Preamble of the Articles states:
To all to whom these Presents shall come, we the undersigned Delegates of the States
affixed to our Names send greeting.
973
improvement, a Constitutional Convention was called in the summer of
1787. 49 The Convention was composed of delegates representing twelve of
the thirteen newly independent states. 50 While several eminent personages
of the Revolutionary Era were notably missing," the assemblage was
nonetheless impressive.52 Each man was prominent in his own right, most
having studied law, served in a colonial or state legislature, or served in
Congress. 53 Most were also well-versed in the renowned philosophical and
political theories of government expounded by Locke, Montesquieu, and
others.5 4 It is also proper to assume, without exception, each man must have
also arrived in Philadelphia in May 1787 and departed in September 1787
knowing every letter of his respective state's constitution.
Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire,
Massachusetts-bay Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Georgia.
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION pmbl. Article III of the Articles provides:
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general
welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks
made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other
pretence whatever.
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. Ili. The years of "political and economic dilemmas" seen in
America following the 1781 ratification of the Articles proved the "futility and weakness of
confederacies of independent states." Bruns, supra note 9. Some of the identified weaknesses
were that "the central government ... had insufficient power to regulate commerce ... could not tax
. .. was generally impotent in setting commercial policy . . . could not effectively support a war
effort... [and] had little power to settle quarrels between states." Id. The federal government under
the Articles was essentially "impotent" and "weak." Id.
49. See Bruns, supra note 9.
50. See id. Playing the part of the black sheep, as was its general custom in the founding era,
Rhode Island refused to participate in the Convention it considered to be a "conspiracy to overthrow
the established government." Id.
51. See id. The "towering figures" of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were absent as they
were assigned to foreign missions across the Atlantic in England and France, respectively. Id. John
Jay remained in New York in the Foreign Office. Id. On a slightly different bent, Patrick Henry had
"suspicions" that the delegates "had in mind the creation of a powerful central government and the
subversion of the authority of the state legislatures." Id. He was correct, of course, and refused to
attend the Convention. Id.
52. See id. Those in attendance included George Washington, James Madison, Benjamin
Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, John Dickinson, Gouverneur Morris, Oliver
Ellsworth, Edmund Randolph, William Paterson, John Rutledge, Elbridge Gerry, Roger Sherman,
Luther Martin, and Charles Cotesworth Pickney. Id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
974
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B. State Constitutions as Textual Predecessors to the Federal Constitution
1. State Constitutions' Pervasive Influence and Impact on the Federal
Constitution
The role the original state constitutions played in the framing of the
Federal Constitution is greatly underreported and underappreciated.55 A
simple yet careful examination of the text of each of the early state
constitutions can quickly prove their collective and substantial influence and
impact on the subsequent Federal Constitution. Many of the most well-
known ideas and clauses found in the Federal Constitution first appeared in
one or several state constitutions-some even verbatim. The following
chart 56 connects ideas and clauses of the Federal Constitution drafted in
1787 and the Bill of Rights adopted in 1791 with parallel ideas and clauses
found in at least one, and sometimes several or most, early state
constitutions.
55. See supra note II (describing major constitutional law textbooks' failure to mention state
constitutions and lack of consideration of state constitutions in legal discussions).
56. These twenty-seven comparisons are a thorough but not exclusive list of parallel language
found in the federal and state constitutions. Some of the language used in the Federal Constitution is
found verbatim in earlier drafted state constitutions; other language shows very clearly the same idea
and intent, but does not use the exact language. Compare N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. X ("Excessive
bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments
inflicted."), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.") (emphases added). Additional examples
beyond this list of close comparisons between language and ideas found first in one or several state
constitutions will quickly become evident upon further examination. The purpose of this list is
twofold: first, to highlight the best examples and the best-known clauses; and second, to give the
reader a strong sense of the reliance placed on state constitutions by the drafters of the Federal
Constitution, without shifting too much focus away from the main topic of the vice presidency.
More comparisons were available, and fewer comparisons probably would have sufficed, but this
chart should impress upon the reader an appreciation of the point without being overly burdensome.
Additionally, this list includes both the Federal Constitution and the Bill of Rights because there is
strong evidence that the original Constitution would not have been ratified by some states if it had
not been immediately followed by amendments listing such individual rights as were included in
1791. See Bruns, supra note 9.
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FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
& BILL OF RIGHTS
Bicameral Congress - art. I, § 1
Impeachment Power - art. I, § 2, cl. 5
Selection of Legislative Officers - art. I, § 2,
cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 5
Senator Classification - art. I, § 3, cl. 2
Trial of Impeachment- art. I, § 3, cl. 6
Congressional Adjournment - art. I, § 5, cl. 4
Revenue Bills Originate in the House of
Representatives - art. I, § 7, cl. 1
Bicameral Passage / Presentment and
Presidential Veto / Congressional Override -
art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3
Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws -
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
N.H. CONST. (1776)
VA. CONST. (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. III (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 2 (1776)
MD. CONST. art. I (1776)
N.C. CONST. art. I (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. 11 (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. 11 (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. I (1780)
VA. CONST. (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 23 (1776)
PA. CONST. § 22 (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778)
S.C. CONST. art. IX (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. V (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 5 (1776)
N.C. CONST. art. X (1776)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. VII
(1780)
VA. CONST. (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 4 (1776)
PA. CONST. § 19 (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. XI (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. VIII
(1780)
N.H. CONST. (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. XIV (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XVII (1778)
S.C. CONST. art. VII (1776)
VA. CONST. (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. VI (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 6 (1776)
MD. CONST. art. X (1776)
S.C. CONST. art. XVI (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. VII
(1780)
N.Y. CONST. art. III (1777)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. 11 (1780)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XV; art. XVI
976
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art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; art. 1, § 10, cl. 1
Presidential Vesting Clause-art. II, § 1, cl. 1
Oath or Affirmation of Office - art. II, § 1, cl.
7; art. VI, § 1, cl. 3
Commander in Chief Clause - art. II, § 2, cl. 1
Nomination and Appointment of Officers -
art. II, § 2, cl. 2
Take Care Clause - art. II, § 3
Establishment Clause - amend. I
Free Exercise Clause - amend. I
Freedom of Speech - amend. I
Freedom of the Press Clause - amend. I
More Perfect Vice Presidency
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(1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXIV (1776)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXIV (1780)
S.C. CONST. art. XXX (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. XVII (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XI (1778)
S.C. CONST. art. XXXIII (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. XXIII (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 22 (1776)
PA. CONST. §§ 10 and 40 (1776)
N.C. CONST. art. XII (1776)
GA. CONST. art. XXIV (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XXXVI (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. I (1780)
S.C. CONST. art. III (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 9 (1776)
PA. CONST. § 20 (1776)
N.C. CONST. art. XVIII (1776)
GA. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777)
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. III (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. VII
(1780)
S.C. CONST. art. XXV (1776)
S.C. CONST. art. XXXII (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. IX
(1780)
PA. CONST. § 20 (1776)
N.Y. CONST. art. XIX (1777)
N.J. CONST. art. XVIII (1776)
DEL. CONST. art. 29 (1776)
N.C. CONST. art. XXXIV (1776)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. XVIII (1776)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 11 (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXXIII (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XIX (1776)
GA. CONST. art. LVI (1777)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11 (1780)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS. art. XII (1776)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12 (1776)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XII (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXXVIII (1776)
Assemble and Petition Clause - amend. I
Well-Regulated Militia / Right to Bear Arms
Clause - amend. II
No Quartering of Soldiers Clause - amend. III
No Unreasonable Searches and Seizures /
Warrants - amend. IV
No Compelled Witness Against Self /
Deprived of Life, Liberty or Property Without
Due Process / Takings - amend. V
Right to a Speedy and Public Trial / Impartial
Jury / Informed of the Nature and Cause of
Accusation / Confronted With Witnesses /
Obtain Favorable Witnesses / Assistance of
Counsel - amend. VI
Right to Trial by Jury Preserved - amend. VII
No Excessive Bail / Excessive Fines / Cruel
and Unusual Punishment - amend. VIII
Powers Reserved to the States - amend. X
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XV (1776)
GA. CONST. art. LXI (1777)
S.C. CONST. art. XLIII (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI (1780)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVI (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVIII (1776)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XIII (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS. art. XXV (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVII (1776)
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII (1780)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXVIII (1776)
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXVII (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 10 (1776)
PA. CONST. art. X (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XXIII (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776)
PA. CONST. art. IX (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XLX; art. XX
(1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. VII; art. XII
(1776)
S.C. CONST. art. XLI (1778)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X; art. XII (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776)
PA. CONST. art. IX (1776)
MD. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XIX (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. VII (1776)
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 11 (1776)
N.J. CONST. art. XXII (1776)
PA. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XI (1776)
PA. CONST. § 25 (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XIV (1776)
GA. CONST. art. LXI (1777)
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XV (1780)
VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 9 (1776)
PA. CONST. § 29 (1776)
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. X (1776)
GA. CONST. art. LIX (1777)
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXVI (1780)
MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. IV (1780)
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While not purporting to be comprehensive, the ideas and clauses listed
in the chart above clearly show striking similarities between the original
Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights and many of the state constitutions. 7
Moreover, the length of the list is meant to impress upon the reader the
pervasive influence the state constitutions had on the Convention delegates
who obviously borrowed liberally in all areas. A similar review of the
Articles of Confederation would create a much shorter list, as far fewer
phrases and ideas were borrowed from the Articles for use in the
Constitution.5 8  Therefore it stands to reason that, after one founding
document failed, the delegates returned to the sources with which they were
most familiar and which were in fact the original American documents
purporting to ordain and establish new and independent governments. In
effect, the delegates returned to their respective state constitutions, the
laboratories of independent, democratic government design, and in so
returning they carefully selected from a wide variety of ideas and clauses the
structure of government and the individual rights that reflected the highest
ideals of the nascent nation.
2. State Constitutions' Specific Influence and Impact on the Vice
Presidency
Much has already been written on the creation and inclusion of the vice
presidency in the Federal Constitution and, in truth, where the idea of a
second-highest office in government came from is already "clear": "the
office of Vice-President of the United States was the national counterpart of
the lieutenant governor-a familiar, traditional state official., 59 The idea
57. Indeed, a quick count reveals that each of the eleven original state constitutions included at
least one phrase, clause, or idea that was later used in the Federal Constitution.
58. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION(1781).
59. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 20. It is the who that is unclear. Four general "schemes of
government" were offered during the 1787 summer by four notable delegates, and none of the
original schemes were clearly the progenitor of the ultimate plan to include a Vice President in the
design of the new government. Id. at 14-15. It was in the Committee of the States in late August
and early September where "some unknown member or group of members established the vice-
presidency of the United States essentially as formulated in the final draft." Id. at 18. While
Alexander Hamilton's plan appears to be the closest to the ultimate design, there is no pinpoint
source to point to for the exact creation of the structure and purpose of the vice presidency. Id.
Hamilton's proposed sketch of government was presented to the Convention on June 18, 1787, but
was never formally voted upon. Id. at 16. It was from this presentation that the vice presidency
seemed to grow. Id.
979
behind the vice presidency "was to apply nationally the system prevailing
in... New York and nine other states. All had either a Lieutenant-Governor
or (as in Pennsylvania) a Vice-President who, in most instances, was also the
presiding officer of the upper house., 60 But while it is clear that the designs
of the state governments directly influenced the vice presidency in its
original form, what degree of impact did they have? And how many states
were actually considered?
Professor Akhil Amar, after describing "the selection rules for the
Constitution's second-highest office [as] an evident democratic
improvement on American colonial practice, ' ' 6' expounded on the state
executive branch leadership systems that existed at the time, as they related
to the new federal position:
Whether the vice-presidential selection system represented an
advance over the best systems devised by state constitutions in the
decade after independence was more doubtful. In most states,
lieutenant governors hardly mattered because governors themselves
had few real powers and no independent electoral base. In
Massachusetts and New York, where statewide voters picked
powerful governors, the electorate chose lieutenant governors by
separate ballot. By contrast, Article II did not allow federal electors
to vote separately for vice president. 62
Professor Richard Albert gave even more credit to the New York State
Constitution for the design and powers of the vice presidency:
[I]n fashioning the Vice Presidency, the Founders did not operate in
vacuity, devoid of any conception of political and practical
workability. Quite the reverse, in fact, for before them stood the
existing 1777 Constitution of the State of New York, which featured
a lieutenant governorship-an executive office bearing a striking
resemblance to the very office the Founders ultimately enshrined in
the U.S. Constitution as the Vice Presidency. Indeed, the New York
lieutenant governorship served as a model for the Founders-
60. Id.
61. AMAR, supra note 10, at 167. According to Professor Amar, "[i]n royal and proprietary
colonies, lieutenant or deputy governors customarily enjoyed no more democratic legitimacy than
governors themselves. Both sets of officers were picked by English monarchs or aristocrats rather
than chosen by the people or their representatives." Id- In the newly independent states there was
definitely democratic improvement with regards to having more popular elections for state
executives. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. III (1778) (providing that members of both the Senate and
House of Representatives would jointly elect a governor); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII (1777) (providing
that freeholders would elect the governor).
62. AMAR, supra note 10, at 167.
980
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namely those writing to the citizens of New York under the
penname Publius urging ratification of the proposed federal
Constitution-in elaborating their own rendering of a second-in-
command.
Specifically, the American Vice President shares similarities
with the New York lieutenant governor on each of the three bases
that were determinative in shaping the Vice Presidency: (1)
selection; (2) vacancy; and (3) Senate leadership .... These three
issues in particular ... appear to have catalyzed the creation of the
Vice Presidency.63
These acknowledgments by Professors Amar and Friedman are both
accurate and appropriate in terms of the ultimate design of the vice
presidency, but they do not go far enough in discussing the probable
influence and impact, albeit less than New York and Massachusetts, that the
other state constitutions also must have had on the formation of the vice
presidency. 64 As further review demonstrates, the similarity between the
state and Federal constitutions shown in the chart above is also true of the
designs for the early state executive branches and the vice presidency.
In 1787, the Founders "said little about [the vice presidency] in the
Constitution itself., 65  In fact, the Federal Constitution mentions the office
of Vice President in only five clauses.66 The vice presidency appears two
63. Albert, supra note 1, at 815-16.
64. Neither professor seems to have paid any particular attention to the other state constitutions
vis-A-vis the vice presidency. See generally AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-70; Albert, supra note 1,
at 815-16. Professor Akhil Amar did carefully review the early state constitutions for other
comparisons to the Federal Constitution, but did not extend his analysis directly towards
consideration of the second-highest office. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 555-56.
65. Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 510. The general duties could actually be
summed up in a short paragraph.
The initial Constitution provided only the following with regard to the vice president:
that he would be President of the Senate "but shall have no vote" except in case of a tie;
that he would be elected to serve during the same term as the President by electors in a
single competition for President in which the runner-up would be installed in the second
office; that he would succeed to or act as President following presidential vacancy; and
that, along with the President and "all civil officers of the United States," he could be
removed from office upon impeachment and conviction.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 4; art. I, § 3, cl. 5; art. II, § 1; art. II, § 1, cl. 6; art. II, § 4.
Professor Goldstein gives an explanation as to why so little was said about the Vice President in the
constitutional text:
The relatively cryptic references to the vice presidency in the original Constitution,
supplemented by comment during the founding period, suggest a vision of the office as it
times in Article I, the article dedicated to the legislative branch. 67  The first
appearance of the vice presidency is found in Section Three, Clause Four
and reads: "The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. 68
This clause is notable for two reasons: first, it gives the vice presidency
its only real "employment" beyond staying alive to succeed the president;
69
and second, it cuts against the founding principle of separation of powers.7 °
But while it was one of the most debated issues surrounding the creation of
the vice presidency during the Constitutional Convention, it was not a
wholly unprecedented design in the founding era.71
The New York State Constitution was indeed the principal mold that
formed the vice presidency, and a comparison of the language used in each
constitution shows the parallel framework.72 It provides, in language almost
mirroring the federal clause, that the "lieutenant-governor shall, by virtue of
his office, be president of the senate, and, upon an equal division, have a
casting voice in their decisions, but not vote on any other occasion."73 New
York was not, however, the only state constitution that designed a leadership
initially existed. First, the founders did not view the Vice President as terribly important
to the business of government. On the contrary, some expressed misgivings about the
office. "Such an officer as Vice President was not wanted," said Williamson, a member
of the Committee of Eleven. Elbridge Gerry opposed creating the office he would later
be the fifth to hold. Hamilton acknowledged that some viewed "appointment of an
extraordinary person" to be Vice President as superfluous. No comment from the
Constitutional Convention reflected enthusiasm for the vice presidency. The failure of
the founders to provide for filling a vice presidential vacancy speaks volumes regarding
their view of the office. They had no doubt the country could survive the loss of a Vice
President. Someone else would assume his functions; the office would remain vacant.
Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 515 (internal citations omitted).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (emphasis added).
69. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 537 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (quoting
Roger Sherman saying the Vice President "would be without employment" if he was not President
of the Senate).
70. In fact, "[t]he framers created the vice presidency as something of a constitutional hybrid
between the executive and legislative branches." See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at
515. Professor Amar, describing the election process for president and vice president and offering
one reason for the position breaking the separation of powers principle, explained:
To discourage electors from warping the system by wasting their out-of-state votes on
frivolous candidates-thereby reverting to a fractured contest among local favorites-the
framers provided that the runner-up in the presidential race would serve as vice president.
Not only would this runner-up stand a proverbial heartbeat away from the presidency
itself, but he would also preside over the Senate and break its tie votes. The nation's first
vice president would end up tipping the Senate balance on twenty separate occasions.
Electors thus had good reason to take their out-of-state votes seriously.
AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68.
71. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 14-20.
72. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4, with N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
73. N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
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system that violated the purist idea of separation of powers. 4 Three other
states also created systems of government that specifically allowed for the
person who would succeed the state governor or president to be a member or
leader of a legislative body. 75 New Jersey, for example, allowed for the
legislative "Council" to "choose a Vice-President who shall act as
[governor] in the absence of the Governor."76  Delaware required that
the "speaker of the legislative council for the time being shall be vice-
president ...and shall have the powers of a president . . . ., And the
North Carolina Constitution provided that the "Speaker of the Senate for the
time being ... shall exercise the powers of government ... ."78 Other states
specifically reject a violation of the separation of powers principle in their
constitutions, 79 but overall the idea of a legislative officer (or quasi-
legislative in the cases of the New York Lieutenant-Governor and ultimate
Federal Vice President) being the immediate successor was not wholly
74. The idea of separating the legislative, executive, and judicial functions stemmed from the
writings of the political theorist Montesquieu and was adopted to some extent by each of the newly
independent states. See KMIEC, supra note 11, at 105-09; see, e.g., MASS. CONST. (1780); N.Y.
CONST. (1777); S.C. CONST. (1778). A separation of powers purist would disallow any crossover
functions between any of the three governmental branches. For example, an executive officer could
appoint any subordinate executive officer without the advice and consent of the Senate, or the
judiciary could not hold a legislative act to be unconstitutional.
75. There is a discrepancy between this Article's review of the early state constitutions and
Professor Williams' statement included above that the idea for the vice presidency "was to apply
nationally the system prevailing in ... New York and nine other states. All had either a Lieutenant-
Governor or (as in Pennsylvania) a Vice-President who, in most instances, was also the presiding
officer of the upper house." See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 16. By my calculation six of the nine
states Professor Williams counts had their successor come from an executive body-usually some
type of council-rather than a legislative body. See GA. CONST. art. XIX (1777) ("executive
council"); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 3, art. 11 (1780) ("council"); MD. CONST. art. XXVI (1776)
("Council to the Governor"); PA. CONST. § 19 (1776) ("executive council"); S.C. CONST. art. V
(1776) ("privy council"); VA. CONST. (1776) ("Privy Council, or Council of State"); see also
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776 - 1787, at 138-39 (saying
that in most colonial governments, but not in early revolutionary state constitutions, the upper branch
of the legislature also served as the governor's council). This Article proceeds upon the idea that
only New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and North Carolina fit my working definition of a violation
of separation of powers.
76. N.J. CONST. art. VII (1776).
77. DEL. CONST. art. VII (1776).
78. N.C. CONST. art. XIX (1776).
79. GA. CONST. art. 1 (1777) ("The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be
separate and distinct ...."); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (1780) ("In the government of this
commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or
either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the
end it may be a government of laws, and not of men.").
983
unprecedented or novel enough to shock any of the delegates at the
Convention.
The other mention of the Vice President in Article I is in Section Three,
Clause Five, which provides: "The Senate shall chuse their other Officers,
and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States."8 °
What is notable here is that the Constitution itself anticipates the Vice
President being frequently absent from presiding over the Senate.8 The
language conveys the idea that the Vice President will have reasons for his
absences, including but not limited to exercising the "Office of President.
82
The Constitution's silence on when and how the Vice President will exercise
or succeed to the presidency has of course led to many interpretations of the
Vice President's role in the Executive Branch. 83
Somewhat parallel to the "Absence" and "exercise" Clause, Article II,
Section One, Clause Five delineated the presidential succession principle by
providing for times when the Vice President would in fact discharge
Presidential powers and duties:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties
of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President,
and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and
such Officer shall act accordingly until, the Disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected. 
84
This clause gave the Vice President his primary purpose in the federal
government-as a "presidential understudy" or "stand-in.,
85
Several state constitutions also used language that, like the Federal
Constitution in Article I, Section Three, Clause Five, and Article II, Section
One, Clause Five, seemed both to anticipate absences in the second-highest
office and to anticipate the occasional succession to "exercise" the highest
80. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
81. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 516 ("It was altogether appropriate that
the Vice President be of high stature, as the framers anticipated that he would 'occasionally become
a substitute for the President."') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossitered., 1961)).
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5.
83. For instance, it remains uncertain whether the Vice President is a constitutional executive
officer. See Amar, supra note 1, at 200-07.
84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
85. Albert, supra note 1, at 814.
984
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office either temporarily or permanently.16  The New York Constitution
again stood as the chief, but not only, model for these federal clauses.8 7 The
New York Constitution first provided that "whenever the government shall
be administered by the lieutenant-governor, or he shall be unable to attend as
president of the senate, the senators shall have power to elect one of their
own members to the office of president of the senate, which he shall exercise
pro hac vice."'8 8 And second, the New York Constitution provided that upon
"impeachment of the governor, or his removal from office, death,
resignation, or absence from the State, the lieutenant-governor shall exercise
all the power and authority appertaining to the office of governor until
another be chosen, or the governor absent or impeached shall return or lie
acquitted . . . ,,89 This language detailing the succession procedure is very
similar to the language found in eight other state constitutions, which also
used the terms "death," "inability," "absence," "removal," and "resignation"
for succession purposes. 90
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; art. 11, § 1, cl. 6; see also Friedman, supra note 1, at 1707-08
("Constitutionally, there is very little to it at all. The vice-president is officially the presiding officer
of the Senate, but that has long meant little; even the Framers anticipated that this would be a no-
show job. He casts a deciding vote if the Senate is tied, but the vote cannot truly be considered his
own ....").
87. N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
88. N.Y. CONST. art. XXI (1777). No other state constitution had language similar to this clause
because in 1787 New York was the only state that had made the Lieutenant-Governor also the
President of the Senate. See Albert, supra note I, at 815-16.
89. N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
90. See DEL. CONST. art. VII (1776) ("And on [the president or chief magistrate of the state's]
death, inability, or absence from the state, the Speaker of the Legislative Council for the time being
shall be Vice President, and in case of his death, inability, or absence from the state, the Speaker of
the House of Assembly shall have the powers of a President ...."); GA. CONST. art. XXIX (1777)
("The president of the executive council, in the absence or sickness of the governor, shall exercise all
the powers of the governor."); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. III (1780) ("Whenever the chair of
the governor shall be vacant, by reason of his death, or absence from the commonwealth, or
otherwise, the lieutenant governor, for the time being, shall, during such vacancy, perform all the
duties incumbent upon the governor, and shall have and exercise all the powers and authorities,
which by this constitution the governor is vested with, when personally present."); MD. CONST. art.
XXXII ("That upon the death, resignation, or removal out of this State, of the Governor, the first
named of the Council for the time being shall act as Governor, and qualify in the same manner
..... ); N.C. CONST. art. XIX (1776) ("And on [the Governor's] death, inability, or absence from the
State, the Speaker of the Senate for the time being -- (and in case of his death, inability, or absence
from the State, the Speaker of the House of Commons) shall exercise the powers of government after
such death, or during such absence or inability of the Governor (or Speaker of the Senate,) .... );
N.J. CONST. art. VII; art. VIII (1776) ("[T]hat the council themselves, shall choose a vice president,
who shall act as [Governor] in the absence of the governor[;]" and "[t]hat the governor, or, in his
absence, the vice president of the council, shall have the supreme executive power ...."); S.C.
CONST. art. X (1778) ("That in case of the absence from the seat of government or sickness of the
governor and lieutenant-governor, any one of the privy council may be empowered by the governor,
985
The two remaining times the Vice President is mentioned in the
Constitution both also come in Article 1I, the Executive Branch article. 9 In
Section One, Clause One of that article the manner of selection is revealed:
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and,
together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected as
follows .... 92
The clause continued on to describe in detail the original method of
election: utilizing an Electoral College system, having the Vice President
preside over the vote-counting, and sending tie or minority votes to the
under his hand and seal, to act in his room .... "); S.C. CONST. art. XIV (1776) ("That in case of the
death of the president and commander-in-chief, or his absence from the colony, the vice-president of
the colony shall succeed to his office, and the privy council shall choose out of their own body a
vice-president of the colony, and in case of the death of the vice-president of the colony, or his
absence from the colony, one of the privy council (to be chosen by themselves) shall succeed to his
office .... "); VA. CONST. (1776) ("A Privy Council ... shall annually choose, out of their own
members, a President, who, in case of death, inability, or absence of the Governor from the
government, shall act as Lieutenant-Governor.").
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; art. II, § 4.
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The original language (now superseded by Amendment XII)
provided:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice
President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President
of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if
such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there
be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them
for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the
List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the
President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State
having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members
from two-thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the
greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there
should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them
by Ballot the Vice President.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cls. 1-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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House of Representatives or the Senate.93 The Vice President's term also
paralleled that of the President, providing for similar four-year leadership
tenures. 94
The three state constitutions of New York, South Carolina, and
Massachusetts also provided for the concurrent selection of both the
Governor and the Lieutenant Governor. 95 New York's election procedure
was the closest to the original federal election system, yet it did differ in
certain respects. 96 It provided "[tihat a lieutenant-governor shall, at every
election of a governor, and as often as the lieutenant-governor shall die,
resign, or be removed from office, be elected in the same manner with the
governor, to continue in office until the next election of a governor .... ,,9'
While the first and last parts have corresponding federal counterparts, the
middle part providing for the immediate election of a new Lieutenant
Governor when necessary, was not paralleled by the federal clause.
98
Rather, the original Federal Constitution in this respect more closely
followed the wordings of the constitutions of South Carolina99 and
Massachusetts, 00 both of which did not provide for immediate election if a
new Lieutenant Governor became necessary.'O' As for the electoral college
system, while it is true that no state at that time had designed or utilized a
similar system, reasons unique to a national and federalism-based
government were the basis for that particular departure from previously
implemented state systems. 102
93. See id. Following the Twelfth Amendment the election procedure changed. U.S. CONST.
amend. XII. The major change was the elimination of double balloting-electors were now to
distinguish who was being selected for President and who was being selected for Vice President on
distinct ballots. Id. This effectively created the tied-ticked election process, which was due to the
emergence of political parties. See AMAR, supra note 10, at 168.
94. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, cls. 1-3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
95. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. I (1780); N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777); S.C. CONST. art.
111 (1778).
96. SeeN.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
97. N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777).
98. Compare N.Y. CONST. art. XX (1777), with U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
99. S.C. CONST. art 111 (1778) ("[C]hoose by ballot . .. a governor and commander-in-chief,
[and] a lieutenant-governor, both to continue for two years ....").
100. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. I (1780) ("There shall be [annually] elected a lieutenant
governor ... in the same manner with the Governor .....
101. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 6.
102. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 18-19 (describing the debates over the Electoral College).
Professor Akhil Amar described the purpose of the Electoral College system for federal elections:
The idea behind [the original Federal Constitution's] intricate double-ballot system was
to generate support for continental candidates. Many framers fretted that if given only
one vote, each elector would likely support his home state's leading candidate at the
987
The final mention of the Vice President in the Constitution appears in
Article II, Section Four-the Removal Clause: "The President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors. '"103 This clause provided an important
restraint on the Executive Branch, balancing the broad and largely undefined
executive power with a bicameral legislative check."0
This federal clause also has its preceding state equivalents. The New
York, 105 South Carolina, 10 6 and Massachusetts107 constitutions all provided
for the possibility that a Lieutenant Governor could be removed
upon impeachment, just as the Federal Constitution provided that the Vice
President as well as President could be "removed from Office
on Impeachment .... "108 New York,109  South Carolina, 110 and
Massachusetts"'. likewise placed the impeachment power in the most
populous branch of their legislatures, heralding the later federal language
and form of impeachment.' 12 Moreover, like the Federal Constitution, both
South Carolina 13 and Massachusetts, 1 4 though not New York, provided that
expense of candidates with broader national appeal. Double balloting promised to cure
this problem by inducing each elector to give one vote to a local candidate and the other
vote to a more national figure. Ideally, second votes would settle on men who might be
everyone's second choice-broadly acceptable leaders of wide geographic repute. To
discourage electors from warping the system by wasting their out-of-state votes on
frivolous candidates-thereby reverting to a fractured contest among local favorites-the
framers provided that the runner-up in the presidential race would serve as vice president.
Not only would this runner-up stand a proverbial heartbeat away from the presidency
itself, but he would also preside over the Senate and break its tie votes. The nation's first
vice president would end up tipping the Senate balance on twenty separate occasions.
Electors thus had good reason to take their out-of-state votes seriously.
AMAR, supra note 10, at 167-68 (footnote omitted).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
105. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777) ("[T]he power of impeaching all officers of the State ... be
vested in the representatives of the people in assembly .... ").
106. S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778) ("[T]he form of impeaching all officers of the State ... be
vested in the house of representatives .... ").
107. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. VI (1780) ("The house of representatives shall be the
grand inquest of this commonwealth .... "); pt. 2, ch. 1, § 1, art. VIII ("[A]I1 impeachments made by
the house of representatives, against any officer or officers of the commonwealth ....
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
109. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777).
110. S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778).
Ill. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. VI (1780).
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.").
113. S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778) ("That the senators and such of the judges of this State as are
not members of the house of representatives, be a court for the trial of impeachments .... ).
114. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. VII (1780) ("The senate shall be a court with full
authority to hear and determine all impeachments made by the house of representatives, against any
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the Senate be a trial court for all impeachment proceedings."1 5 The primary
difference between the Federal Constitution and these several state
constitutions on impeachment matters was the language describing on what
charges an officer such as the Vice President could be impeached and tried.
The New York ' 6 and South Carolina'17 Constitutions both used the phrase
"for mal and corrupt conduct in their respective offices," and
Massachusetts"18 used the phrase "for misconduct and mal-administration in
their offices" for impeachable offenses. The delegates at the Convention
considered these alternatives under which the House of Representatives
could bring impeachment proceedings, and ultimately chose the similar
phrasing: "Impeachment for... Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.""19
Ultimately, the evidence confirms the conventional wisdom that New
York's design of the lieutenant governorship was the primary model for the
vice presidency, but the evidence also goes further than others have been
officer or officers of the commonwealth ... [t]heir judgment [not extending] further than to removal
from office .... ).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.").
116. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXIII (1777).
117. S.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1778).
118. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. VIII (1780).
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Professor Akhil Amar explained why the Federal Constitution
decided upon this specific language:
In America, by contrast [to the English system which had no system to oust a monarch],
the head of state [and Vice President] could be ousted whenever he committed any "high
Crimes [or] Misdemeanors" that warranted his immediate removal. In context, the words
"high ... Misdemeanors" most sensibly meant high misbehavior or high misconduct,
whether or not strictly criminal. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states mutually
pledged to extradite those charged with any "high misdemeanor," and in that setting the
phrase apparently meant only indictable crimes. The Constitution used the phrase in a
wholly different context, in which adjudication would occur in a political body lacking
general criminal jurisdiction or special criminal-law competence. Early drafts in
Philadelphia had provided for impeachment in noncriminal cases of "mal-practice or
neglect of duty" and more general "corruption." During the ratification process, leading
Federalists hypothesized various noncriminal actions that might rise to the level of high
misdemeanors warranting impeachment, such as summoning only friendly senators into
special session or "giving false information to the Senate." In the First Congress,
Madison contended that if a president abused his removal powers by "wanton removal of
meritorious officers" he would be "impeachable . . . for such an act of
maladministration." Consistent with these public expositions of the text, House members
in the early 1800s impeached a pair ofjudges for misbehavior on the bench that fell short
of criminality. The Senate convicted one (John Pickering) of intoxication and indecency,
and acquitted the other (Samuel Chase) of egregious bias and other judicial improprieties.
AMAR, supra note 10, at 200.
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willing to admit. 2 0 It demonstrates that not just one or two, but many state
constitutions were considered during deliberations as the delegates were
drafting the federal office of the Vice President.' 2' Indeed, the delegates
surveyed the model governments that had been working before their eyes for
the prior decade, reflected on their recent experiences in their home states,
and selected different designs and phrasings according to their sometimes
similar and other times unique national purposes.
C. A Missed Opportunity to Form a More Perfect Vice Presidency from the
Start
But even with eleven state constitutions to review and consider,
122
coupled with the delegates' strong grasp of political philosophy and
history, 2 1 the Convention's final draft of the new nation's founding
document remained imperfect. The principal reason for imperfection is
unquestionably that the delegates drafting the Constitution during the
summer of 1787 were merely continuing the great experiment of
representative democracy on a grand scale and pursuing the "Glorious
Cause" of independence started in 1775 and embodied in the Declaration of
Independence in 1776.124 They were attempting to form a type of
government unique in the history of mankind, and had only limited
experience with state governments, guesswork, and good intentions to guide
them. 1
2 5
While the Constitution has endured some criticism over the years, the
vice presidency in particular has been singled out for an uncommon amount
of criticism and ridicule, 126 mostly because it was saddled with more than its
120. See supra notes 59-119 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 59-119 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 11, 50-54 and accompanying text.
124. See JEFF SHAARA, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE (2003) (a historical novel about the American
Revolutionary War which borrowed its name from the term which was the popular description of the
fight for independence).
125. Consider that state constitutions had only existed and their governments had only been
operating under them for between four and eleven years before 1787. See supra notes 32-46 and
accompanying text.
126. Many jokes have been made at the vice presidency's expense. "Once there were two
brothers: one ran away to sea, the other was elected Vice-President-and nothing was ever heard
from either of them again." Attributed to Thomas R. Marshall, Twenty-Eighth Vice President,
available at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/t/thomas-r-marshall.html. "The Vice-
Presidency is sort of like the last cookie on the plate. Everybody insists he won't take it, but
somebody always does." Attributed to Bill Vaughan, journalist, available at http://www.sccs.
swarthmore.edu/users/0l/kyla/quotations/v.htm. Moreover, many former Vice Presidents have been
vocal in criticizing their former office. See Albert, supra note 1, at 831 ("John Nance Garner [Vice
President under Franklin D. Roosevelt] remarked that accepting the vice presidential nomination was
'the worst damn fool mistake I ever made.' And Also that the job wasn't worth 'a bucket of warm
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fair share of baggage from the very start. While uniqueness can excuse
some of the flaws inherent in the position as it appeared in the original 1787
text, it cannot excuse all of them. A closer look immediately reveals the
primary reason the vice presidency was a disproportionately imperfect part
of the Constitution-it was essentially a constitutional "afterthought."'
127
The records from the Constitutional Convention paint a fairly
disappointing picture of the time and consideration spent on the topic of the
vice presidency by the delegates. Though slightly foreshadowed by
Alexander Hamilton's June 18, 1787, address before the Convention, neither
the precise form nor even the idea of a specific successor to the chief
executive officer was raised during the early summer. 12  In fact, as of
August 6, over two months into the Convention, the successor of the
President was the "President of the Senate, himself a Senator and chosen by
the Senate itself as presiding officer."' 129 Delegates still opposed many parts
of the succession scheme, however, and debate of the issue was further
delayed. 130  Finally, on August 31, a Committee of the States was
established that formed the ultimate design for the vice presidency.'1
3
Debate on the office of Vice President did not occur until September 7,
however, but the ultimate form was already set by the Committee. 132
Several delegates felt the office either unnecessary or grossly violative of the
spit."') (internal citations omitted); id. at 832 ("In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy said that his
Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson, had 'the worst job in Washington.' When Johnson later
succeeded to the Presidency, he could not help but follow Kennedy's example of debasing the Vice
Presidency.") (internal citation omitted); id. ("As recently as the 2004 presidential election, Senator
John McCain conveyed a similar lack of enthusiasm, likening the vice presidential nomination to
being 'fed scraps."') (internal citation omitted). The list could go on and on.
127. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at v (calling the office an "after-thought"); Albert, supra note I, at
812, 815 (describing "the Vice Presidency as little more than a postscript to the text of the
Constitution, an afterthought whose eventual creation was virtually accidental" and an office that
"merited little attention at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Only near the close of the
Convention was the office even considered, raised as an option, and subsequently introduced for
debate and discussion."); Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note I, at 510 (calling it an
"afterthought" and saying "[t]he founders apparently took the office seriously for the first time late
in the Constitutional Convention," yet "they said little about it in debate or in the Constitution
itself"); GOLDSTEIN, MODERN V.P., supra note 1, at 3 (saying the office was "not suggested until
the closing days of the Constitutional Convention").
128. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 16.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Id. at 16-18.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 19 ("[T]he Convention turned on September 7 . . . [to] discussion on whether to
establish the office of Vice-President."). It appears that September 7, 1787, was essentially the only
day the office of the Vice President, as it ultimately was found in the Federal Constitution, was a
primary issue of debate. Id. at 17-20.
separation of powers principle, and listed the office of Vice President as one
of the reasons they would not support the Constitution in final draft form.'
33
Ultimately, in the individual state ratification debates, only three states even
discussed the office and no state convention proposed any amendment.
134
Over time, however, the vice presidency has earned more than its fair share
of attention for the brief amount of time spent on it in 1787 and 1788.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INSTITUTION
Since the creation of the vice presidency in the Federal Constitution
there have been several distinct periods through which the office has
traveled. From the very beginning, it seemed the vice presidency was a
position destined to be a proverbial thorn in the nation's side. As a thorn, it
began festering in 1789 and still bothers some today, over two hundred years
and four constitutional amendments later. 1
35
A. A Quick Descent Through the Founding Period
The festering started immediately, beginning with the office's first
occupant. John Adams was one of the founding era's leading men. 136 With
133. Professor Williams describes some of the comments against establishing the vice presidency:
Paradoxically, Elbridge Gerry, who alone among the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention would be elected Vice-President, opposed making that official the President
of the Senate and, indeed, was "against having any vice-President .... We might as well
put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must
subsist between the President & vice-president makes it absolutely improper." To which
Gouvemeur Morris made his oft-quoted rejoinder: "The vice president then will be the
first heir apparent that ever loved his father. If there should be no vice president, the
President of the Senate would be temporary successor, which would amount to the same
thing."
Sherman, also a member of the Committee of the States, remarked that "if the vice-
President were not to be President of the Senate, he would be without employment";
moreover, he pointed out, if a Senator occupied this position he would "be deprived of
his vote, unless when an equal division . . . might happen." But on this proposition,
Gerry was joined by Randolph, Williamson, and Mason. Randolph objected on general
principles; Williamson felt that the "officer ... was not wanted"; Mason contended that
the vice-presidency "mixed too much the Legislative and Executive, which, as well as the
Judicial departments, ought to be kept as separate as possible." The latter suggested that
a Council act as regency on all occasions calling for the succession.
The issue finally came to a vote and the proposal that the Vice-President be the President
of the Senate was carried, eight states to two.
Id. at 19.
134. Id. at 20.
135. Four constitutional amendments have been drafted and ratified to get the position to where it
stands today, an imperfect but greatly improved second office. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S.
CONST. amend. XX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXII; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
136. See generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001); TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY:
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 22-27 (James M. McPherson ed. 2000) (hereinafter TO THE BEST OF
MY ABILITY); DAVID C. WHITNEY, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 17-25 (8th ed. 1996)
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revolutionary credentials third, perhaps, only to His Excellency George
Washington and the illustrious Benjamin Franklin, 3 7 Adams entered the
office not having been part of the Constitutional Convention. 138  Nobody
knew exactly what the Vice President was supposed to do vis-A-vis both his
relationship to the President and as President of the Senate, Adams
included. 39  Known equally for his great ability and his volatile
temperament,140 he felt his way through his first term with varying degrees
of success. 141 Though he at times counseled with President Washington,
141
the "only regular constitutional duty of the vice-presidency [was] to preside
over the Senate" and being at once the vain, passionate and witty man that
he was, he "early stamped the [Senate] chamber as his plaything" and took
an active role in Senate proceedings. 143 However, before the end of his first
137. See JOSEPH ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY (2004) (biography of George Washington); H.W.
BRANDS, THE FIRST AMERICAN: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2002).
138. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 22 ("[Adams'] three years as American envoy to England, a
thankless task in view of British coldness and unwillingness to negotiate, kept him abroad at the time
the Constitution was drafted."); Bruns, supra note 9.
139. President George Washington
established a clear-cut rule of conduct for himself with regard to his heir apparent ...
[saying he] would most certainly treat [the Vice President] with perfect sincerity and the
greatest of candour in every respect. [He] would give him [his] full confidence, and use
[his] utmost endeavors to cooperate with him .... "
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 22-23. This initial "formula could well serve as a model for relations
between President and Vice-President. There was nothing to indicate from these beginnings that the
latter [office] would shrink into the 'forgotten man' of American politics." Id. at 23.
140. See To THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra note 136, at 22. John Adams was "insecure,
volatile, impulsive, irritable, suspicious, self-pitying, self-righteous, and filled with often
combustible rage." Id. Adams was also considered "'the most vain, conceited, impudent, arrogant
Creature in the World,' yet others could describe him as having 'the clearest head and finest heart."'
Id. Moreover, "[o]f all the Founders, [Adams] was the wittiest, most loving, most passionate, and,
because of his robust sense of humor, among the most companionable." Id.
141. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 22 ("When Adams assumed the vice-presidency, he seemed
to be much concerned with etiquette and leaned toward monarchical pomp," yet "[n]o future Vice-
President was to be more significant as a partner in government. Adams enjoyed the personal
esteem of the President and was frequently consulted by him in those social and diplomatic affairs
that were considered his specialties."). But opinions were somewhat varied:
In performing his official duties as presiding officer of the new United States Senate,
Adams took part in discussions and tried to guide the deliberations of the body. His ten
years abroad in the capitals of kings had led him to respect pomp and protocol, but his
efforts to introduce in the new government what he regarded as a proper ceremoniousness
merely won him an undeserved reputation as a monarchist.
WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 22.
142. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 23.
143. Id. John Adams had a large personality and "the personality of the presiding officer was a
major factor in [the deliberations of the Senate, which at that time averaged a working membership
of twenty-two]." Id. "From the first he refused to be the impartial chairman" but later "he tended to
term, Adams was entirely frustrated with the position and wrote his wife
Abigail that "[m]y country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most
insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his
imagination conceived. . . ."44 The frustration caused by having great men
occupy a "meaningless" office was the first sign of imperfection in the
office. 145
Thomas Jefferson was the second Vice President. 146 Another great man
of the generation, Jefferson seemed to feel much differently about the office
than his predecessor did. 147 He wrote that "[a] more tranquil and
unoffending station could not have been found for me... the second office
of the government is honorable and easy, the first is but a splendid
misery." But like his predecessor, he also became a frustrated spectator of
national policy and events, though this was mostly due to the emergence of
national parties and the fact that President was a Federalist, while he himself
was a Democratic Republican. 149 Ultimately Jefferson considered his four
years in the second office a "period of 'semi-retirement."' 5  The Vice
President being at odds with and virtually independent of the President was
the office's second sign of imperfection.' 1
retreat into silence during debates which he was powerless to affect." Id. at 23-24.
144. Letter from John Adams, Vice President of the United States, to Abigail Adams (1793). This
was by no means the limit of his frustrations. See WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 22 (Adams wrote
that the office "requires rather severe duty, and it is a kind of duty which, if I do not flatter myself
too much, is not quite adapted to my character-I mean it is too inactive and mechanical"). John
Adams' wife Abigail is a notable figure in American history in her own right:
Abigail Adams was considered sharper than a woman ought to be; she also read more
than a woman was supposed to and spoke out even when the custom of her time and
gender called for silence. In a famous March 1776 letter, she beseeched her husband to
"remember the ladies" when making laws for the new republic: "Do not put unlimited
power in the hands of husbands," she wrote. "Remember, all men would be tyrants if
they could."
To THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra note 136, at 24.
145. GOLDSTEIN, MODERN V.P., supra note 1, at 3.
146. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 24-30; To THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra note 136, at 28-
35; WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 26-38.
147. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 25 ("On his part, Adams on the eve of inauguration visited
Jefferson to ask him if he would go to France as a special presidential emissary to bring about better
relations with the revolutionary government there. Jefferson declined to do this on the theoretical
grounds that it was outside his constitutional domain and on the practical side that it was not his
responsibility to lighten his opponent's burden.").
148. See WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 35. Jefferson "did not distain the second place; in view of
the squalls he saw coming he could think of no other office he would have preferred." WILLIAMS,
supra note 1, at 26.
149. WHITNEY, supra note 137, at 35. In fact, Professor Williams describes Adams as President
and Jefferson as Vice President as "the first test of political incompatibles in the two chief national
offices [resulting] in practical mutual non-intercourse and embargo." WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at
25.
150. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 26.
151. See id. at 25-26 (detailing how Adams and Jefferson could not work together like
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The election of 1800 proved to be the third strike against the original
design and performance of the vice presidency, and led to the "fateful" tie in
the electoral college and the first "constitutional crisis."'' 52  Ultimately, the
Constitution had not been drafted foreseeing an electoral tie,' 53 and in Aaron
Burr's defense, did not require the party favorite to step aside. 154  After
thirty-six ballots the first crisis was averted, and the first major flaw in the
Constitution relating to the vice presidency was exposed. 5 5 The first major
improvement to the structure of the vice presidency followed this crisis
when in 1804 the Twelfth Amendment was passed as "a response to an
embarrassing logical omission" and "inherent mechanical flaws" in the
constitutional election scheme. 1
56
B. A Useless Century Followed by "Gradually Increasing Prominence ,157
Several members of Congress made an attempt to abolish the vice
presidency prior to the passage of the Twelfth Amendment, but it failed to
Washington and Adams had, and describing the "whole affair" as a precursor to the lack of
"availability" for vice presidential assignments).
152. Id. at 26-27.
153. There was always the possibility of an electoral tie, but the process of "sloughing" votes-
one party having one or several electors vote for a different candidate in order to prevent a tie-was
meant to avoid that result. Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 922.
154. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 27 (stating "[n]o one doubted that Jefferson was the first
choice of the Republicans and that Burr had been chosen merely for the vice-presidency, but the
Constitution did not recognize this distinction"). Professor Williams described the scene:
Since Jefferson and Burr were tied with 73 votes each, the issue was thrown into the
House of Representatives for decision, where the vote would be by states. However, the
"lame-duck" House with its strong Federalist bloc had no interest in easing the tasks or
solving the problems of the victorious Republicans. Through 35 ballots, a decision was
delayed while the House defied the popular mandate and Jeffersonian stalwarts
threatened that "ten thousand republican swords will instantly leap from their scabbards"
if their hero were cheated out of the White House. Throughout this crisis, Burr remained
in Albany, watchful and waiting, contenting himself with avowing in a letter that, given a
tie between Jefferson and himself, he would wish his friends to prefer the former.
Id.
155. See id. ("Burr could well have had the Federalist support necessary for the presidency if he
had cared to become a hostage of the conservatives; he declined to do so .... On the thirty-sixth
ballot, Thomas Jefferson was elected the third President of the United States .... )
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Lieber, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
2249, 2256 n.25 (1995); Brett W. King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution:
The Framers, The Federalist Papers and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 381 (1998). The Twelfth Amendment ultimately "brought the presidency
closer to the voters" but, at the same time, "reinforced slavocrats' unfair advantage in the electoral
college." AMAR, supra note 10, at 315.
157. Albert, supra note 1, at 832.
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pass in either the House of Representatives or the Senate, and the position
moved forward into the nineteenth century.' 58 It did so after prophetic
claims that the office would plummet in esteem and the office holders would
decline in caliber. 5 9  Indeed, the common perception among vice
presidential scholars is that the experiences of the first full century of the
office "gave reason to rue [its] creation ... .,,160 The credentials and
abilities of many Vice Presidents were paltry at best.'61 Their contributions
to the office and the nation tended to be even worse. 62  While several
noteworthy Vice Presidents did inhabit the office between 1800 and 1900,
they proved to be exceptions to the rule. 1
63
Theodore Roosevelt proved to be the most capable and prominent man
to become Vice President since Adams and Jefferson over one hundred years
earlier, but the office could not truly claim him as its own. 64 Ultimately he
158. See GOLDSTEIN, MODERN V.P., supra note I, at 6-7 (noting that the vote failed "19 to 12 in
the Senate and 85 to 27 in the House of Representatives").
159. See id.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Professor Goldstein commented on the generally poor quality of nineteenth century Vice
Presidents:
Some prominent men still did accept the second office. John C. Calhoun and Martin Van
Buren were among the early Vice Presidents. More often, however, the vice-presidential
nomination was awarded as a consolation prize to a defeated faction of a party. The
credentials of some nominees were ludicrous. George Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, and
Rufus King were in advanced years and failing health. Others had scant experience. The
prior public service of Chester A. Arthur consisted of seven years as collector of customs
for the port of New York. Garret A. Hobart had never held a post higher than state
legislator in New Jersey. Six of the twenty-three Vice Presidents in the century were not
nominated to seek another term with the Chief Executive. Six others died in office. On
four occasions nineteenth-century Vice Presidents succeeded to the nation's top job
following the death of the elected Chief Executive. Their administrations were largely
undistinguished. None was nominated to seek another independent full term.
Id.
162. The Vice Presidents were often more trouble in their office than they were worth:
[They] posed problems for many Chief Executives. Jefferson ignored Adams's entreaties
to undertake diplomatic missions, viewing such activity as inconsistent with his
leadership of the opposition party. Burr was no more helpful to Jefferson. Clinton
refused to attend Madison's inauguration; Andrew Johnson came to that of Abraham
Lincoln but in a state of advanced inebriation. Calhoun cast the decisive vote against
Jackson's nomination of Van Buren as ambassador to Great Britain, exacerbated tensions
in the administration over the Peggy Eaton affair, and split with the President on states'
rights. Arthur denounced President James Garfield to a newspaper editor.
Nor did Vice Presidents always meet a high standard of behavior. Burr killed Hamilton
in a duel and was later charged with, though acquitted of, treason for allegedly conspiring
to "liberate" the Louisiana Territory from the United States. Richard Johnson seemed
more interested in presiding over his tavern than over the Senate. John Breckinridge
became a Confederate general and later Secretary of War after his term ended. Schuyler
Colfax was nearly impeached for improper financial dealings.
Id. at 7-8.
163. See id.
164. Roosevelt's ascent to the office of Vice President was actually the Republican party and
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served fewer than six months in the office, only five days of which were
while Congress was in session. 165 To the nation's benefit, Roosevelt
succeeded to become President when William McKinley was shot by an
assassin. 166  It is amusing but ultimately fruitless speculation as to how
Roosevelt would have affected the vice presidency, as his larger-than-life
persona and talents were incontrovertibly more suited for the role of
President. 167
After the century of intermittent participation and influence in the
Executive Branch, the office began to gradually "advance toward and
ultimately into influential circles."'' 6' Although Vice Presidents occasionally
consulted with and participated in Executive Branch activities during the
nineteenth century, it was not until 1921, when Vice President Calvin
Coolidge attended Cabinet meetings as an official member at President
Warren G. Harding's request, that the profile of the vice presidency started
President McKinley's attempt to hide him in an office where he would not upset the establishment:
By early 1900 it had become apparent that the Republicans of New York would like to
get rid of this young governor [Theodore Roosevelt] that they could not control. They
began to talk of pushing him upstairs into the vice presidency. Promptly, in February
1900, Roosevelt issued a statement: "under no circumstances could I or would I accept
the nomination for the Vice-Presidency" .... When he made one of the seconding
speeches for the renomination of McKinley, the [Republican National Convention] went
wild and nominated him as McKinley's running mate by acclamation, although Mark
Hanna, the Republican national chairman, was not pleased. "Don't any of you realize
that there's only one life between this madman and the White House?"
WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 209. Roosevelt never sought the vice presidency; rather his party was
trying to get him out of the way. Id.
165. Id. at 209-10; see also WILLIAMS, supra note I, at 81 ("Roosevelt had had no experience in
presiding over a legislative body and seems not to have tried to prepare himself for his one certain
duty beyond poring over 'back files of the Congressional Record' for a few days. As a matter of
fact, he was to preside only for five days, (March 5 to 9, 1901) ....").
166. See TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, supra note 136, at 180; WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 83;
WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 209-10. While the assassination of a President could usually be
considered a horrible and tragic event, I describe it as a benefit to the nation primarily because the
Republican party was trying to hide Theodore Roosevelt in an office where it hoped he would
ultimately become a non-entity in national politics, a result that would have deprived the nation of
one of its brightest stars. See supra note 164.
167. Two tremendous volumes describe in great detail the many skills and talents of Theodore
Roosevelt. See EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1979); EDMUND MORRIS,
THEODORE REX (2002). Theodore Roosevelt's brief experience in the office made a large but
negative impression on him. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 83 ("It was little wonder that T.R. felt
'the vice-presidency is an utterly anomalous office (one which I think ought to be abolished).'").
Moreover, he is widely considered one of the five greatest American Presidents. See Historical
Rankings of United States Presidents, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical-rankingsofUnited_
StatesPresidents (hereinafter Historical Rankings) (compiling twelve surveys of presidential
scholars and listing Theodore Roosevelt at an average rank of 4.83).
168. See Albert, supra note 1, at 832.
to turn a comer. 169 President Franklin D. Roosevelt went even further in the
1930s and early 1940s by assigning major responsibilities to two of his Vice
Presidents-John Nance Garner as a legislative liaison and Henry Wallace
as chair of the Economic Defense Board. 70 Perhaps his failure in keeping
his third Vice President, Harry Truman, "apprised of such critical
information as the existence of an atomic bomb" was his largest contribution
to the office's growth in prominence and influence, because Truman's
experience ultimately "catalyzed a historic broadening of the vice
presidential mandate." 171
Harry Truman may be the fourth greatest man to hold the office of Vice
President, but like Theodore Roosevelt, the office can hardly claim him.
172
His tenure as Vice President was even more short-lived than Theodore
Roosevelt's, as Franklin Roosevelt died less than three months into his
fourth presidential term. 173 Truman's succession to the presidency was both
to the nation's benefit and to the vice presidency's benefit.
174
Understandably troubled by his lack of knowledge of the creation and testing
of the atomic bomb, Truman established the National Security Council and
made the Vice President an ex officio member.175 Truman's experience in
the second office, while brief, made him realize the need for the Vice
President to be adequately prepared in the event of unexpected
succession. 176
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 832-33 (Truman pledged that "no Vice President would ever be as inadequately
prepared as he had himself been under Roosevelt .... ). Professor Williams described Truman's
official relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Truman . . . was to say: "I don't think I saw Roosevelt but twice as Vice-President
except at Cabinet meetings." [George E.] Allen is correct in asserting, "Truman settled
inconspicuously into the Vice-Presidency .... Like other Vice-Presidents before him, he
was forgotten by most Americans until the day death made him President of the United
States."
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 219.
172. See Historical Rankings, supra note 167 (listing Harry S. Truman as consistently in the top
seven Presidents and with an average rank of 7.18).
173. See WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 283 (noting that Truman's vice presidential tenure lasted
less than one hundred days: January 20 to April 12, 1945); WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 219
("Truman was to be Vice-President for only 82 days, during which time he conscientiously carried
out his senatorial, Cabinet and legislative liaison duties.").
174. See Albert, supra note 1, at 833; WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 283; To THE BEST OF MY
ABILITY, supra note 136, at 234-41; see generally DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN (1992).
175. See Albert, supra note l, at 833.
176. See id.
What did the American people get when Vice-President Harry S. Truman became
President on April 12, 1945? They got a man who, if uninformed about details of war
and diplomacy, let existing policies work themselves out .... The new President found
out what existing policies were and then made decisions in keeping with them. When
new situations arose, not covered by existing plans or policies, Truman would make his
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The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration also provided a "great leap"
in the vice presidency's status, both domestically and internationally.
17
Two-term Vice President Richard M. Nixon was "masterful" in his role
and his success in the vice presidency became the standard for future
meaningful participation in an administration.' The 1960s also saw an
"accelerated ... institutionalization" of the vice presidency, including:
(1) in 1961, vice presidential offices moved from Capitol Hill to the
executive compound, closer to the White House; (2) the executive
budget for the first time, in 1969, listed a line item for the Vice
President under "Special Assistance to the President," a formulation
that has survived to this day; (3) in 1974, the Vice President was
given a distinct support staff, freed from relying on White House
administrative support; and, among others; (4) vice presidential
offices again moved, this time in 1977, from the executive
compound into the West Wing, an indication of the Vice
Presidency's growing cachet. 179
Part of the stimulus driving all of the institutional changes of the vice
presidency in the nineteenth century were three constitutional amendments,
each affecting the office and each occurring within a thirty-five year span.
180
own determinations (as, for instance, the decision to use the atom bomb in the war
against Japan).
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 223-24. But with regards to the vice presidency, Truman championed a
bill in Congress that changed its shape permanently:
[T]he most significant event of [Truman's Vice President Alben Barkley's] tenure was
[Barkley's] becoming the first Vice-President to sit on the National Security Council (Act
of August 10, 1949).
Of all the legal powers and duties conferred on Vice-Presidents since the establishment of
the office, none was remotely so significant as this statutory membership. As the highest
councilling body to the Chief Executive, the NSC comprises the top echelon of
presidential policy assistants. And the Vice-President was not merely a courtesy
member, but a full legal participant. Since the NSC is charged by law with "the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security" no
important aspect of national administration was outside the purview of the Vice-
President.
Id. at 233-34.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 335 ("During his eight years as Vice President,
from 1953 to 1961, Nixon took a more active role in the government than had any previous holder of
the office.").
179. Albert, supra note 1, at 834.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XX; amend. XXII; amend. XXV. The Twelfth Amendment had been
passed in 1804 following the Jefferson/Burr debacle, and while it had changed the face of the vice
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The Twentieth Amendment, the "lame duck amendment," was ratified in
1933 and provided protection against undemocratic "machinations" of an
outgoing Congress and Executive.' 8 ' This amendment had a double effect
on the vice presidency: first, it changed the end of a term to noon on January
20 for the President and Vice President, shortening a possible lame duck
period; and second, it created contingency plans for presidential
succession. 82 The Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, was a
check on the idea of an "imperial executive" and was in direct response to
the unprecedented four terms of Franklin D. Roosevelt.' 83 Its two primary
effects on the second office were to limit any possible "imperial Vice
Presidency" and also to "liberate [] a second-term Vice President to openly
seek her party's nomination ... ,184 Finally, and arguably the most
significant amendment concerning the vice presidency, is the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment ratified in 1967.185 This amendment, more than any other, both
vaulted the office of Vice President into "modem significance" and helped
cement the position as one of critical importance in the modem era. 1
86
C. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Modern Era, and the Future of the
Office
The ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment forcefully made the
important statement that "vice presidential vacancies are no longer
tolerable."' 8 7 It "responded to the need for reliable presidential leadership in
the nuclear age, in which the timetable for military action, whether offensive
or defensive, was compressed into a matter of mere minutes.""' As a
presidency, it did not lead to institutional growth. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX; Albert, supra note 1, at 836, 845-46.
182. See Albert, supra note 1, at 845-53.
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII; Albert, supra note 1, at 853-59.
184. Albert, supra note 1, at 856-57.
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV; Albert, supra note 1, at 859-65; Goldstein, Constitutional
V.P., supra note 1.
186. Albert, supra note 1, at 859; see Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1.
187. Albert, supra note 1, at 859.
188. Id. at 860. Senator Birch Bayh, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments and person directly responsible for crafting the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, described the dilemmas he dealt with in the wake of the Kennedy assassination in
1963:
Now, I thought, Lyndon Johnson was President; he was assuming an office whose
burdens were enormous even without their having been increased by the tragedy [of the
Kennedy assassination] that had descended upon all of us. Like many of my fellow
countrymen, I prayed-for this man as well as for his predecessor.
Yet in the midst of my misery, I reflected on the distinguished credentials of the man who
was to take over the reins of government in this crisis. He had been a congressman, a
senator, Majority Leader, then Vice President-over thirty years of service in the highest
echelons of government. No other man had come to the Presidency with such
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"vision of the vice presidency . . . as an integral part of American
government," the Amendment was a decisive step towards fixing the role as
one of prominence, deserving of the nation's second-highest office. 189
Although the Amendment was not a perfect one, it made the vice presidency
more perfect, and catapulted the "resurgence and redevelopment" of the
office into what it always could have been.' 90
In addition to this monumental amendment, the Walter Mondale vice
presidency in the Jimmy Carter administration really "set in motion the
contemporary transformation" of the office. 19' From 1977 through 1981, the
Mondale model made permanent the Vice President as an "active participant
in executive government."' 92 This model included frequent access, growing
influence, and a high level of operating independence within the Executive
Branch, all movements towards greater importance that have only
accelerated in subsequent administrations. 193 Vice President Al Gore began
experience. As Vice President, he had been uniquely suited to contribute to the making
of important governmental decisions. Now he would be the one to make those decisions,
seeking in turn the counsel of his Vice President. But there I sat up sharply. There was
no Vice President now! The thoughts came flooding to my mind: I remembered the
1948 Presidential Succession Act, which provided for a line of succession in case the
President and Vice President died at the same time, or in case the President died and there
was no Vice President. But, at this moment, the United States had no Vice President, and
to make matters worse there was absolutely no way to fill the vacancy in that office. For
almost a hundred years, members of Congress and scholars had been trying to find a way
to solve the dilemma of Presidential succession: so far they had not been able to do so.
BAYH, supra note I, at 6.
189. Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 526.
190. Id. at 529. Professor Albert summarized some of the "shortcomings" Professor Goldstein
admits are still present in the second section of the amendment:
Section two of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment exhibits several shortcomings: (I) there is
no accepted standard for congressional ratification of the President's nomination; (2)
Representatives and Senators may be tempted to put partisanship ahead of national
interest and therefore delay or otherwise disrupt the vice presidential appointment
process; (3) the confirmation process delves into the nominee's personal life; and (4) the
procedure allows a vice presidential nominee to be confirmed and perhaps subsequently
ascend to the Presidency via succession without validation from the electorate.
Albert, supra note I, at 864. On this final point, President Gerald R. Ford was an example of an
appointed Vice President who succeeded to the presidency without ever being elected to any office
higher than a congressional representative. See WHITNEY, supra note 137, at 372-74.
191. Albert, supra note I, at 834; see Robert A. Rankin, Editorial, Gore Expands Role of Vice
Presidency, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5, 1993, at Ml (describing Mondale as the Vice President who
"set the model for the modem vice presidency as the president's senior advisor on virtually
everything").
192. Albert, supra note 1, at 834; see Judith Yates Borger, Mondale: "I am So Proud of this
State", DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Nov. 7, 2002, at A5 (stating Mondale changed "the vice presidency to
a position of participating in governing").
193. Albert, supra note 1, at 834 (stating that the changes begun with the Carter/Mondale
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his campaign for the office alongside President Bill Clinton, both men
touting a partnership of almost "co-Presidents."' 194  Gore's eight years in
office and his accomplishments during that time served to "further
augment[] the power and prestige of America's understudy," in effect taking
the office into the twenty-first century.' 
95
The current Vice President, Richard B. Cheney, has played probably the
most extensive role of any office holder in American history, wielding more
influence and having a greater impact on a wider spectrum of policy matters
than any of his predecessors. 196 One major factor in this result is of course
President George W. Bush and his tendency to delegate heavily and rely
equally as much on those close to him whom he trusts. 197 Cheney's history
and relationship with the President was one not before seen in a
administration appear to be permanent).
194. See id.
195. See id. at 835. Vice President Al Gore brought even more power to the vice presidency
during his eight years than Mondale had in his four years. Id. at 835-36 n. 143-44.
196. See Kenneth T. Walsh et al., The Cheney Factor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 23,
2006, at 40; Peter S. Canellos, Cheney Wields the Real Power, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Apr. 6, 2006,
at A 15. Some commentators first saw Cheney as a Vice President who would "invigorate" the office
and give it real power:
Historically, the vice president has functioned like the second son in a royal family. He
generally has maintained a high sense of status, indulged in a few helpful projects, and, in
most instances, stayed ready to assume power in the event of the president's death or
resignation. In most administrations, the vice president has been kept on a short leash.
(President Lyndon Johnson had a characteristically crude term for describing his
dominance over his veep, Hubert Humphrey.)
So when Cheney, who had already been White House chief of staff under President Ford,
emerged as a dominant player in the Bush administration, many people expressed relief
that someone had found a way to invigorate one of the most famously underpowered
positions in American politics.
Id.
197. See Walsh et al., supra note 196. In fact, some commentators now believe Cheney has
obtained too much power for his position:
Cheney's power went beyond even the strongest chiefs of staff, as he appointed former
aides and allies to key positions, and sought to ride herd over the State, Defense and
Justice departments. Cheney's office coordinated the case for war with Iraq, and it was
Cheney who recently delivered the ultimatum that the United States would never allow
Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. As he would with a chief of staff, Bush acceded to
Cheney's moves, willingly placing the vice president at the top of the White House flow
chart.
But while it may be logical that the second-most clout in the country should go to the
elected vice president rather than a Cabinet secretary or staff mountebank, the
disadvantages of such a power structure are becoming apparent. For while statements
and policies crafted by staff members or Cabinet secretaries can be disavowed and the
official sent packing, the vice president can't be dismissed.
Even if Bush wanted to marginalize Cheney, and there's no evidence that he does, he
would have to remove all the Cheney loyalists from the defense secretary on down and
still wake up to Cheney sitting in the West Wing every morning. Only Congress can
remove a vice president, and only then for "high crimes and misdemeanors."
Canellos, supra note 196.
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President/Vice President combination, and this undoubtedly affected the role
he played in the administration in ways that might not be replicated or
extended.' 98  But what is undeniable is that the vice presidency has now
been "elevated ... to its apex as a veritable ganglion of political influence
and authority" with few places to go (if anywhere) from here.1 99
So the question now becomes, where can the vice presidency go?
Should it go there? Would it be an improvement or merely a change? What
methodology should we use to decide?
IV. WHERE THE DEBATE STANDS TODAY
Several leading vice presidential scholars remain critical of the vice
presidency and have proposed certain changes-they insist improvements-
to the structure and powers of the office.200 Across the board, every idea
submitted has two themes upon which it stands: first, the founding principle
of popular legitimacy and democratic choice of the people; 201 and second,
the imperative that the candidates with the greatest ability be attracted to and
elected to the nation's second-highest office, particularly in today's global
and nuclear age. 02  Considering popular legitimacy, Professor Richard
Albert reviewed the "modem . . . democratization of the American polity
and American public institutions" and stated:
Consider the Constitution's vision for the popular legitimacy of
public officials, as evidenced by the authorization of separate
ballots for electing the President and Vice President [in the Twelfth
Amendment], the solicitation of public input to fill vice presidential
vacancies [in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment], and the direct election
of United States Senators [in the Seventeenth Amendment]. Or the
Reconstruction Amendments, which abolish slavery, extend the
equal protection of the laws to all individuals, and authorize citizens
of all ethnicities to exercise their franchise.0 3
198. See Walsh et al., supra note 196.
199. See Albert, supra note 1, at 836.
200. See Friedman, supra note 1; Amar & Amar, supra note 1.
201. See Albert, supra note 1, at 869-96 (saying popular consent is a major feature of the vice
presidency and positing that the position may have popular legitimacy problems in its current state);
see also Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 938, 944; Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726 (calling this
principle his "Democracy Postulate").
202. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at v.
203. Albert, supra note 1, at 880-81 (footnotes omitted).
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Ultimately, Professor Albert advocates that "any reform [of the vice
presidency] must fit squarely within this distinctive and distinguishing motif
of democratic and popular legitimacy. '' 204  A similar motif drove the
Constitutional Convention delegates with regards to ability:
The idea of the Founding Fathers was that the Vice-President
should be the man next best qualified in the country to be President,
surely a notably wise concept. It was implemented by an
arrangement under which the Vice-President was to be the man to
get the second highest vote for President in the Electoral College.
But this could only work if there was no party system; and when
that was introduced the Constitution was amended [through the
Twelfth Amendment] to provide a separate vote for Vice-President.
This amendment threw the high office of Vice-President into the
dust of party politics, where it has remained for most of our
subsequent history. 205
But while these two principles of the American ideal stand prominently
in plans to actively transform the vice presidency, are they alone enough to
necessitate this change?
The following two proposals for the continued reform of the vice
presidency have been submitted relatively recently by notable vice
presidential scholars.2 °6 Each proposal has been responded to by equally
distinguished scholars who point out certain flaws and drawbacks of the
proposals.2 °7 None of the proposals or responses, however, have used the
methodology this Article submits as the appropriate means for analyzing and
applying any potential constitutional change regarding the vice
presidency. 208 No scholar has yet to perform a comprehensive review of the
state constitutions and apply those results to the scales weighing for or
against change. After mapping the landscape of the modem vice
presidential debate, this Article will do just that.209
204. See Albert, supra note 1, at 881.
205. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at v.
206. See Friedman, supra note 1; Amar & Amar, supra note 1.
207. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 550-54, 556-57; Albert, supra note 1, at
880-83.
208. See supra notes 10, 11,27, 23-24 and accompanying text.
209. See infra Part V.
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A. Proposal One: The Vice President Should be Elected Separately
The first proposal for changing the vice presidency, made by Professors
Richard Friedman, Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar, is that the Vice
President should be elected separately from the President. 210  Friedman
states his belief plainly: "[w]ho shall be president and who shall be vice-
president are two separate questions, and the best candidates are not
necessarily on the same ticket.",21' The Amars concur, arguing that
"significant benefits might accrue" if this proposal was implemented.212
The current process is essentially controlled by laws in the fifty states
which govern the structure of presidential/vice presidential voting ballots.2"3
Ticket-tying ballot designs and write-in candidate rules in most states make
it difficult, if not impossible, for a voter to register a preference for a certain
combination of major political party candidates for President and Vice
President, thereby forcing the voter to vote for the unified party ticket or a
combination of obscure candidates. 214 While Professor Friedman calls for a
constitutional amendment to put the proposal into action,21 5 the Amars call
the current process a "constitutional custom" and say that "neither Article II
nor the Twelfth Amendment obliges persons to vote for a President and a
Vice President of the same party., 216 They maintain that freeing voters from
210. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726-30; see generally Amar & Amar, supra note 1.
211. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726. Professor Friedman called it "likely" that in at least the
1956 and 1968 elections "voters would have split their tickets, had they been given the simple
democratic option to do so." Id.
212. Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 945. The Amars argue using surveys comparing public
acceptance of Vice President Dan Quayle with his Democratic opponent Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Id.
at 916-18. Their premise is that the surveys "strongly suggest [] that a Bush/Bentsen option would
have been attractive to voters in 1988, had they been free to split their executive tickets" and also
that "voters might welcome a ticket-splitting option" in future elections. Id. at 918.
213. See id. at 925-27. The Amars explain:
Election codes in some states provide for vote tying between the offices of President and
Vice President on the general election ballot. Other states do not explicitly codify vote
tying in their election codes. Apparently, the decision to tie presidential and vice-
presidential votes in these states is made by the executive agencies charged with
designing the ballot.
Id. at 925 n.50 (internal citations omitted).
214. See id. at 926 n.54 ("Requiring voters to 'write in' certain options also raises the relative cost
of these options vis-A-vis other options that can be voted for with less effort. At the margins, this
increased cost appears to affect voter behavior.").
215. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726-29.
216. Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 919-20, 924 ("Indeed, the Twelfth Amendment's decoupling
of the selection of the President and Vice President, at least at first blush, seems more consistent
with a regime in which those who cast ballots--electoral collegians and, ultimately, the citizen
voters who today de facto stand behind them-are free to select the two candidates independently.
1005
obligatory ticket-tying and providing them with the option of ticket-splitting
would better serve the overarching principles of democracy and ability that
have been the objective of the American form of government since its
founding.2 17
Democratically, "[i]f the electorate is more interested in the character
and leadership abilities of its executives than in their ideologies, it is no
business of the constitution-makers to dictate that they must sacrifice quality
in order to guarantee ideological continuity. ' 21 8 A major benefit that would
accrue is that an incoming Vice President would have "tenable claim to
electoral legitimacy" rather than be seen as a "mere coattail clutcher."21 9
Moreover, an untied election of the President and Vice President would be in
harmony with the current law and practice in many other areas of voting,
where the electorate is not compelled to vote only for one particular party
slate at the expense of another. 2 0 As to ability and competence, permitting
voters to split their tickets would place a premium on "experience and
competence" in the second office.22' Separate elections would ensure that
vice presidential candidates have "sufficient stature to face the electorate on
their own, [and] that the winner is truly the voter's choice, 222 and "[i]f
parties know that the vice-presidential candidate must compete directly
against the opposing party's vice-presidential candidate, they will be less
likely to put forth weak candidates for that office. ' 2 3  Additionally, a split
Nor do the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment dictate a contrary
result. In fact, the concerns underlying the amendment of Article II had little to do with the potential
for a 'split' executive.").
217. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 920. Interestingly, the Amars addressed the state
practice of "embracing winner-take-all rules [in presidential/vice presidential elections in order to]
maximize the clout of the state's median voters .... " Id. at 928. This practice makes it "much more
likely that a presidential candidate could win a majority of the nation's popular votes, yet lose in the
electoral college." Id. The Amars call that possibility a "true democratic nightmare." Id. Thus,
neatly in their argument for changing the vice presidential selection system, they seem to slip in a
much larger and perhaps more controversial issue which it appears they would also
support-eliminating the Electoral College altogether in the name of democracy. On this point
remember two things: first, that the Bush/Gore election of 2000 fit the "democratic nightmare"
definition, yet the nation survived and politics are as vigorous as ever; and second, that this nation
has never attempted to be a pure democracy, as it has honored yet undemocratic institutions such as
the U.S. Senate (two senators per state regardless of population). Thus, the Amars' argument for a
more democratically selected Vice President is just a smaller part of a larger argument for recasting
many of the nation's founding institutions as more democratic.
218. Friedman, supra note 1, at 1727.
219. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 937; Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726.
220. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 914-16. "Voters may, for example, vote for federal
executive candidates of one party and federal legislative candidates of another. Citizens likewise are
free to cross party lines in electing federal legislators-say by voting for a Republican for the U.S.
Senate and a Democrat for the U.S. House of Representatives." Id. at 914.
221. Seeid.at940.
222. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726.
223. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 945.
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election would give the American people a "watchdog" in the
administration, and perhaps a bona fide "leader of the opposition. 2 24 In the
end, focusing on whether the Vice President is truly seen as "qualified" to
become President in the case of unelected succession leads to the strong
suggestion that, at least occasionally, split tickets could be attractive to
voters and that they should be provided with that option. 25
Professor Joel Goldstein and Professor Richard Albert have each
responded to the call for separate elections and an end to ticket-tying. 26
While Professor Goldstein admits that "all else being equal, it would be
preferable for a Vice President to be elected by the people based on his or
her fitness to be President," he goes on to highlight some negative
consequences that could be the actual effect of separate presidential and vice
presidential elections and possible split-ticket results. 2 7 He first argued that
the theme of democracy is balanced by other competing values in many
areas of government. 2 8  Fixed terms without midterm recall, term limits,
and appointment of department heads are examples of undemocratic yet
popularly accepted restraints inherent in the Constitution. 229  Also, the
ability of the electorate to select a Vice President is "constrained but not
totally denied., 230  The presidency would be impaired because the vice
presidency would gain a new, higher status, either as an "opposition leader"
or "an alternative leader [in the same party] with [his own] national
constituency. '231  These possibilities would create a "loose cannon"
effect. 232 Additionally, an independent Vice President in an administration
224. See id. at 933; Friedman, supra note 1, at 1726.
225. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 917-18.
226. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 550-54; Albert, supra note 1, at 878-93.
227. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 550-54.
228. Seeid. at 551.
229. See id. Senators are fixed to six year terms. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Representatives
are fixed to two year terms. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. I. Presidents can appoint, with advice and
consent of the Senate, almost anybody they choose. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; § 2, cl. 3. Each of
these examples show how there are already built-in limits to the American system of democracy.
230. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note I, at 551. If the voters really disliked a vice
presidential candidate they could easily choose to not vote, petition their political party, or vote for
another party. See id. The media and the political system are strong weapons to fight a disliked
candidate for any office including the vice presidency.
231. See id. at 552.
232. See id. ("[The Vice President's] electoral success would ensure his independence .... [He]
would be a loose cannon waiting to unload, potentially on the President. To be sure, previous Vice
Presidents have on occasion done what they could to embarrass the President. That occurred,
however, in another age when the vice presidency was a different office described by an older
vision. Modem Vice Presidents have observed a different etiquette that demands public
deference."). The Amars responded to the loose cannon argument, saying "loose cannons have
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could also make the vice presidency suffer and undermine the recent growth
in the stature of the office.233 Campaigns would likely be more independent,
and electoral victories would not be a joint effort for which the Vice
President could be rewarded with first-rate assignments.13 4  The current
record, Professor Goldstein suggests, "stacks up pretty well" in terms of
qualified candidates. 235  Furthermore, Professor Albert focuses on the
"stability" problem. 236 Internal inconsistency within an administration and
the potential for a sharp turn in ideology upon unexpected succession could
cool the presently warm relationships recent Vice Presidents and Presidents
have had.237 Separate presidential and vice presidential elections, in the end,
may ultimately have downsides more troublesome than they would be
worth.238
B. Proposal Two: The Vice President Should Hold a Separate Office
Professor Friedman makes a second argument that changing the vice
presidency so that an elected Vice President "be allowed to hold another
political office ... a preexisting job of real power and importance"--that is,
being Vice President should not be a bar to other high-ranking positions.239
He argues not for a set job for every Vice President; rather, he believes that
the President "should be allowed to select a job suited to the talents of
the particular vice-president, who should be appointed to the position in the
existed under the current system. Indeed, the current system may affirmatively tend to create loose
cannons. . . ." See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 938-39.
233. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 553 (saying "[t]he vice presidency would
also suffer from separate elections" because "the place of the Vice President in the executive branch
would be diminished" and the "enhanced role of recent Vice Presidents in the administration has
come largely from their relationship with the President .... Separate election would place these
gains at risk." Id. Moreover, "[t]he situation would be much exacerbated if the Vice President
belonged to the opposition party." Id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 551-52 ("During the past half-century since presidential candidates have chosen
their running mates, the vice presidential candidates on virtually all tickets which had some
reasonable chance of winning have been people of some accomplishment and talent.").
236. See Albert, supra note 1, at 882-83.
237. See id.; Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 553. But see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE 84 (1991) (describing the occasional discontinuity following vice presidential
successions). Professor Ackerman also believes "ideological instability is a systematic
consequence" of modem vice presidential election systems. Id. at 333 n.7.
238. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 554.
239. See Friedman, supra note I, at 1714-15. The reason is that "[flor all the newfound influence
of the office, vice presidential power is still largely a function of the president's willingness to
confer it." Id. at 1709 n.22 (quoting Hubert Humphrey, Changes in the Vice Presidency, 67
CURRENT HIST. 58, 59 (1974)).
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same manner that anyone else would be. ' 240 Examples of possible positions
are "a Cabinet office, or head of OMB [Office of Management and Budget],
or the White House Chief of Staff.",24 1 The benefits that would flow from
such a claim are: fulfillment of the capacity of a Vice President's talents,
better preparation for being President by making him an "integral member of
the administration," and increased attractiveness for candidates who
otherwise may not want to take the role.242 Moreover, once one President
has named a Vice President to a "genuine executive position," other
Presidents would have difficulty not doing the same in subsequent
administrations. 243
Professor Friedman believes that two possible obstacles could also be
easily handled-a constitutional objection based on the Incompatibility
Clause2 " and possible political costs that could result.245  First, it is
uncertain whether the Vice President's official position of President of the
240. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714-15. Professor Friedman contends that "without the
institutionalization that comes from a formal assignment to a well-defined job, the vice-presidency
cannot be relied upon as a genuine training ground for the presidency." Id. at 1715 n.46.
241. See id. at 1714. In fact, eight future Presidents first served as Cabinet secretaries: Thomas
Jefferson (Secretary of State under George Washington); James Madison (Secretary of State under
Thomas Jefferson); James Monroe (Secretary of State under James Madison); John Quincy Adams
(Secretary of State under James Monroe); Martin Van Buren (Secretary of State under Andrew
Jackson); James Buchanan (Secretary of State under James K. Polk); Ulysses S. Grant (Secretary of
War under Andrew Johnson); and Herbert Hoover (Secretary of Commerce under Warren G.
Harding). WHITNEY, supra note 136, at 494-520. Additionally, several Vice Presidents first served
as Cabinet secretaries: Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of State under George Washington and Vice
President under John Adams); John C. Calhoun (Secretary of War under James Monroe, Vice
President under John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson); Martin Van Buren (Secretary of State
and Vice President under Andrew Jackson); Henry A. Wallace (Secretary of Agriculture and Vice
President under Franklin D. Roosevelt); and Richard Cheney (Secretary of Defense under George
H.W. Bush and Vice President under George W. Bush). Id.
242. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714-16.
243. See id. at 1716 n.48 ("[O]nce one vice-president were given a formal and visible position,
such as head of a Cabinet department, succeeding presidents who did not do likewise would appear
to have no confidence in the vice-president.").
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cI. 2. The Clause states:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have
been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;
and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.
Id. While this federal clause does not limit state officers from holding federal office, state
constitutions often include similar clauses that prohibit Governors from holding a federal office. See
infra note 250.
245. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1719-22.
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Senate would be a constitutional obstacle to this proposed change.14 6  A
constitutional amendment could eliminate the "[l]egislative vestige," but
may not be necessary.247
The Vice President should already be considered an "Office under the
United States" and not a "Member" of the Senate; therefore, there would not
be a compatibility problem, and a President should be able to appoint the
Vice President to a Cabinet post or other top position without an
amendment.248 As to possible political problems connected to a President
having a department head he could fire but who would remain his successor,
Professor Friedman contends there are "virtually none" and that they would
be just "ordinary type[s] of political problem[s], [and not] sufficient
reason[s] to keep the vice-president from having meaningful responsibility
in the first place. 249 Overall, he believes both purpose and precedent call
for giving the Vice President more substantial duties.
250
Professor Goldstein responds to Professor Friedman by saying that
adding another substantive job to the vice presidency would not result in a
net improvement to the vice presidency.25 ' First, while "formally the
President would remain responsible and able to remove the Vice President
from his Cabinet position, as a practical matter his ability to retain control
over the sphere delegated to the Vice President would be circumscribed., 25 2
Also, the idea of having a high official whom he could not freely replace
could lead to an uncomfortable position of either not firing a Cabinet
secretary who is underperforming, or having an unhappy Vice President
whom he can only replace at the end of a first term, if at all. 253 Finally, the
246. See id.
247. See id. at 1714.
248. See id. at 1719-22. The President would probably still be required to get advice and consent
from the Senate before appointing the Vice President, however. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
249. See id. at 1716-17.
250. See id. at 1714-18. Professor Friedman also suggests this may extend to the Vice President
taking state political jobs such as Governor. Id. at 1724-25. The major obstacles to such a change,
however, will most likely be the state constitutions themselves, as many of them specifically state
that no state official may hold a federal office. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 11 ("No member of
Congress, or other person holding office under the authority of this State, or of the United States,
shall exercise the office of Governor, except as herein provided.").
251. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 556-57.
252. See id. at 556 (footnote omitted). Professor Friedman in response calls such a situation one
that is "not inevitable, and neither should it be intimidating." Friedman, supra note 1, at 1717.
Friedman cites to when President Franklin D. Roosevelt made his Vice President Henry Wallace
head of the Economic Defense Board during World War II, and after a dispute removed Wallace
"without suffering a debilitating political blow." Id. at 1717-18. Of course, any political blow may
be enough to make a President pause before assigning future Vice Presidents to a similar executive
position.
253. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P., supra note 1, at 556-57. It could be very difficult for a
President to attempt to drop a first term Vice President for a new vice presidential running mate,
potentially fueling an attack from an opponent for having run a bad first administration.
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role of recent Vice Presidents as "generalists" may be preferable for
purposes of both preparation for succession and for flexibility on both the
President and Vice President's parts. 254 The institutional duties that would
be added to the duties of the Vice President would, in the end, not contribute
positively to either the position or the administration.2 55
The foregoing arguments are but a sample of numerous suggestions for
improvement that have been circulated in the public arena.25 6 It is beyond
the purpose of this Article to delve into every possible method of change
proposed for the vice presidency; this Article merely attempts to survey
several prominent issues in this area and apply a different methodology to
the matter at hand. It is clear that both sides of each issue have strong points
and that considerable thought and experience went into the proposals and
rebuttals. But none of the scholars have performed an extensive review to
see whether separate election or additional duties at all reflects the present
state of the second-highest office in each of the states today. 257 This Article
believes such a review is necessary. So the logical next question becomes:
What say the States?
V. WHAT SAY THE STATES?
Where there were thirteen independent states and eleven state
constitutions during the summer of 1787 when Convention Delegates met in
Philadelphia to draft the Federal Constitution,258 today there are fifty states,
each with its own constitution, its own executive branch design, and its own
ideals for organizing a democratic and representative democracy.259 While
it can be properly presumed that the ideals of popular legitimacy and ability
that permeate the federal design also hold true for the several states, it is also
reasonable that in a federalism-based society such as the United States, these
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See, e.g., Albert, supra note I, at 883-95 (describing several ideas for change: "New
Hampshire Vice Presidential Primary;" "Vice Presidential Primary;" "Nominating Convention;"
"Post-Election Vice Presidential Selection;" "Congressional Confirmation;" and "National
Ratification").
257. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (surveying the extent previous scholarly works
have reviewed and addressed the design of state constitutions in this area of government structure).
258. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
259. The Federal Constitution requires states to maintain a "Republican Form of Government,"
but the exact design is not specified and states are permitted latitude in their particular formations of
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
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American ideals may be realized in different and equally effective ways.
Therefore, before changing a national institution such as the vice presidency,
one that was in fact based off of the early designs of state government and
succession models,2 60 it is entirely appropriate to consult the current status of
the original molds of the position. If the state constitutions seem to support
the proposal of separate elections for the two highest offices, perhaps the
Federal Constitution should reflect that reality. Additionally, if state
constitutions seem to encourage or defend the idea of giving more
formalized duties or other executive jobs to the second-highest officers,
maybe the Federal Constitution should do likewise. On the other hand, if the
states are not collectively inclined to separate the elections of their top
officers, this may be a strong indication that either the citizens prefer tied-
ticket elections or they are simply content with the status quo.26 1 Also, if the
states are not giving their second-highest executives duties beyond what is
comparable with the vice presidency's current federal duties, there may be
no compelling reason to expand the role from its current state of existence.
A. The States on Selection
Fifty states out of fifty have designed their constitutions to include an
executive branch with a chief executive who is popularly elected by the
citizens whom he serves.2 62  Not all fifty states, however, have created
systems with a lieutenant governor as the second-highest officer of the
state.2 63  Additionally, states with and without lieutenant governors provide
260. See supra notes 59-121 and accompanying text.
261. The Amars responded to this idea, calling it "inertia-blind inertia, stupid inertia .... " See
Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 944. Of course, if the status quo is not flawed there is no reason to
change. Also, with little success historically in electing split-party candidates, there is no guarantee
a change will be an improvement. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. Moving closer
to a pure democracy may not necessarily be what the people want or the nation needs.
262. See generally ALA. CONST. art. V, §§ 112-37; ALASKA CONST. art. Il1; ARIZ. CONST. art. V;
ARK. CONST. art. 6; CAL. CONST. art. V; COLO. CONST. art. IV; CONN. CONST. art. 4; DEL. CONST.
art. II; FLA. CONST. art. IV; GA. CONST. art. V; HAW. CONST. art. V; IDAHO CONST. art IV; ILL.
CONST. art. V; IND. CONST. art. 5; IOWA CONST. art. IV; KAN. CONST. art. 1; KY. CONST. §§ 69-95;
LA. CONST. art. IV; ME. CONST. art. V; MD. CONST. art. 1I; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § I; MICH.
CONST. art. V; MINN. CONST. art. V; MISS. CONST. art. V; MO. CONST. art. IV; MONT. CONST. art.
VI; NEB. CONST. art. IV; NEV. CONST. art. V; N.H. CONST. pt II, art. 42-59; N.J. CONST. art. V;
N.M. CONST. art. V; N.Y. CONST. art. IV; N.C. CONST. art. Ill; N.D. CONST. art. V; OHIO CONST.
art. I1; OKLA. CONST. art. VI; OR. CONST. art. V; PA. CONST. art. IV; R.I. CONST. art. IX; S.C.
CONST. art. IV; S.D. CONST. art. IV; TENN. CONST. art. III; TEX. CONST. art. IV; UTAH CONST. art.
VII, VT. CONST. ch. 1I, §§ 20-27; VA. CONST. art. V; WASH. CONST. art. 3; W- VA. CONST. art. VII;
WIS. CONST. art. V; WYO. CONST. art. 4.
263. A total of seven states have either a non-executive branch officer or an executive officer such
as a Secretary of State who acts as first successor. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § IA (Secretary of
State); ME. CONST. art. V, § 14 (President of the Senate who is not an executive officer); N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 49 (the President of the Senate who is not an executive officer); OR. CONST. art. V,
§ 8a (Secretary of State); TENN. CONST. art. III, § 12 (Speaker of the Senate who is not an executive
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for the popular election of up to seven executive officials who each have
constitutional duties assigned to them and who each are accountable to the
electorate.2 6 While state governors are similar to the President in that they
are the state's highest ranking official with often-times broad executive
265powers, in many states they differ in that, rather than appointing their
Cabinet-equivalent officers (such as Secretaries of State or the Treasury)
whom they may fire at will,2 66 they must work with executive officers who,
while lower ranking, were themselves directly elected. 67 But the executive
branches in many states are also organized with a clearly stated chief officer
and a clearly stated second officer, following models that are similar to, if
not exactly like, the federal design. 68 Thus, the analysis must lead to the
consideration of comparisons between the nation's second-highest office and
the states' second-highest offices.
A review of the fifty state systems of electing their top executives
reveals that three forms are employed. The first form is the most similar to
the familiar federal system described above, less the electoral college. 69 In
officer); W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 16 (President of the Senate who is not an executive officer);
WYO. CONST. art. 4, § 6 (Secretary of State).
264. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § I (listing "governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of
state, state controller, state treasurer, attorney general and superintendent of public instruction" as
elected executive officers).
265. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I1, § I cl. I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
... "), with ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113 ("The supreme executive power of this state shall be vested
in a [Governor] .... ); compare U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. I ("The President shall be Commander
in Chief .. "), with CAL. CONST. art. V, § 7 ("The Governor is commander-in-chief of a militia
"); compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed
.) with ME  CONST. art. V, § 12 ("[The Governor] shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed .... ).
266. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 53 (1926) (holding
the President has the absolute authority to fire a principle executive officer).
267. See IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
268. In total, forty-three states have a Governor/Lieutenant Governor organizational scheme. See
ALA. CONST. art. V, § 112; ALASKA CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1, 7; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 1; CAL. CONST.
art. V, §§ 1, 9; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. 4, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1, 19;
FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-3; IDAHO CONST. art
IV, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1-2; IOWA CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2; KAN.
CONST. art. 1, § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 69-82; LA. CONST. art. IV, § I(A); MD. CONST. art. 11, §§ I, IA;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, §§ 1-2; MICH. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MISS.
CONST. art. V, §§ 116, 128; MO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 10; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 1; NEB. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 17; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 6;
N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § IA; PA. CONST. art. IV,
§ I; R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 8; S.D. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2; TEX. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 11, § 20; VA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 13; WASH.
CONST. art. 1Il, § I; WIS. CONST. art. V, § 1.
269. All of the states have popular democratic elections for their top executive officials. See
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total, twenty-four states have a Governor and Lieutenant Governor who are
both popularly elected, but who both run on a single party tied-ticket that is
required by the state constitution.270 The Hawaii Constitution in Article V,
Section Two offers a common example of such a provision:
There shall be a lieutenant governor who shall have the same
qualifications as the governor. The lieutenant governor shall be
elected at the same time, for the same term and in the same manner
as the governor; provided that the votes cast in the general election
for the nominee for governor shall be deemed cast for the nominee
for lieutenant governor of the same political party.27'
Other state constitutions have provisions with the same effect but with
slightly different phrasings.272 Moreover, the constitutions of several states
go as far as to organize and govern the pre-election candidate nomination
and running-mate selection procedures within the state, something on which
the Federal Constitution is silent.273 For instance, the Maryland Constitution
provides:
Each candidate who shall seek a nomination for Governor, under
any method provided by law for such nomination, including
primary elections, shall at the time of filing for said office designate
a candidate for Lieutenant Governor, and the names of the said
candidate for Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall be listed on
the primary election ballot, or otherwise considered for nomination
jointly with each other. No candidate for Governor may designate a
candidate for Lieutenant Governor to contest for the said offices
jointly with him without the consent of the said candidate for
Lieutenant Governor, and no candidate for Lieutenant Governor
may designate a candidate for Governor, to contest jointly for said
offices with him without the consent of the said candidate for
supra note 262 and accompanying text.
270. See ALASKA CONST. art. I1, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 5(a); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4; IND. CONST. art. V, § 4;
IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 70; MD. CONST. art. II, § B;
MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2; NEB. CONST. art.
IV, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. V, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. Ill, § la; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 2(2); WIS. CONST. art. V, § 3.
271. HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2.
272. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. Ill, § 8 ("In the general election the votes cast for a candidate
for governor shall be considered as cast also for the candidate for lieutenant governor running jointly
with him."); CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("In the election of governor and lieutenant-governor, voting
for such offices shall be as a unit.").
273. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a); KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; MD. CONST. art. II, § IB; MICH.
CONST. art. V, § 21; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2; N.J. CONST. art. V, § I, para. 4.
1014
[Vol. 35: 967, 2008] More Perfect Vice Presidency
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Governor, said consent to be in writing on a form provided for such
purpose and filed at the time the said candidates shall file their
certificates of candidacy, or other documents by which they seek
nomination. 74
Six of the twenty-four states employing this method provide for
nomination procedures or primaries preceding a tied-ticked general election
in their constitutions, while the other eighteen commit the nominations to
state statute or intra-party decisions. 275 The New Jersey Constitution goes as
far as providing that "[t]he candidate of each political party for election to
the office of Lieutenant Governor shall be selected by the candidate of that
party nominated for election to the office of Goveror.
''76
The second most prevalent form of selecting the two highest officers in
a state is similar to the proposal advocated by Professor Friedman and the
Amars-separate elections for the governor and lieutenant governor. 277 A
typical state constitutional provision reads as follows: "A Lieutenant-
Governor shall be chosen at the same time, in the same manner, for the same
term, and subject to the same provisions as the Governor; he shall possess
the same qualifications of eligibility for office as the Governor .... ,278
The Texas Constitution is perhaps the most explicit, providing
specifically that "[t]he voters shall distinguish for whom they vote as
Governor and for whom as Lieutenant Governor," in sharp contrast to the
constitutional language describing tied-ticket voting procedures: "the votes
cast for a candidate for governor shall be considered as cast also for the
candidate for lieutenant governor running jointly. ' 279 This voting process of
course permits split-party election results as often as the electorate so
chooses.2'0  A total of nineteen state constitutions organize the election
274. MD. CONST. art. II, § I B.
275. See supra note 273.
276. N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4.
277. See supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
278. DEL. CONST. art. Ill, § 19.
279. Compare TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 16(a) (amended 1999), with ALASKA CONST. art. Ill, § 8.
280. Statistics showing whether and how often a state electorate actually chooses a Governor from
one party and a Lieutenant Governor from another party have not been calculated for the purposes of
this Article. If such an analysis were performed and it showed the states that allow split tickets
actually have elections with split winners, this may favor a split-ticket system if it showed a pattern
of popular acceptance of such results and a good working relationship between the two party leaders.
The only historical example of federal split-party election is when John Adams was a Federalist
President and Thomas Jefferson was a Democratic-Republican Vice President in 1796. See supra
notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
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procedures of their executive branch in the "untied" manner suggested by
Professor Friedman and the Amars.281
The third form of selection is the least prevalent, where the constitutions
in seven states follow neither the tied-ticket nor the untied ticket voting
procedures described above.282 The constitutions of Arizona, Oregon and
Wyoming each have a Secretary of State rather than a Lieutenant Governor
as the constitutional successor to the governor. 283  The constitutions of
Maine, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and West Virginia each have a single
elected executive branch official, a governor who appoints all other
executive officers in a manner similar to the federal nomination and
appointment procedure. 84 In these four states, the President of the Senate
(who is not also the Lieutenant Governor of the state) is the successor to the
Governor. 285
When the two election systems for Governor and Lieutenant Governor
are balanced against each other, the scale tilts in favor of a tied-ticket
popular election system-twenty-four tied against nineteen untied.286 Thus,
fifty-six percent of states who have organized their executive branch in a
281. See ALA. CONST. § 114; ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; DEL. CONST.
art. III, § 19; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 3; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 2; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(A);
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, ch. 2, §§ 2, art. 1; MISS. CONST. art. V, § 128; MO. CONST. art. V, § 17; NEV.
CONST. art. V, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 2(1); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. IX, §
1; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 16(a) (amended 1999); VT. CONST. § 20; VA.
CONST. art. V, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also supra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
282. See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
283. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § IA (Secretary of State); OR. CONST. art. V, § 8a (Secretary of
State); WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (Secretary of State). The primary difference in having a Secretary
of State as the first successor to a Governor rather than having a lieutenant governor is that the
Secretaries of State have more specific constitutionally or statutorily defined duties. Any disruption
due to succession may serve to create a larger gap in the executive branch for a time where the
lieutenant governor would have stepped right in and not necessarily left certain constitutionally
prescribed duties unattended.
284. ME. CONST. art. V, § 14 (President of the Senate who is not an executive officer); N.H.
CONST. art. Il1, § 49 (the President of the Senate who is not an executive officer); TENN. CONST. art.
II1, § 12 (Speaker of the Senate who is not an executive officer); W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 16
(President of the Senate who is not an executive officer).
285. See supra note 284. This design also violates the separation of powers principle in that it
allows a legislative officer to succeed an executive officer.
286. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 3; CONN. CONST. art. IV, §
3; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a); HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4; IND. CONST. art. V,
§ 4; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 70; MD. CONST. art. 11, § IB;
MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2; NEB. CONST. art.
IV, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 4; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. V, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. III, § la, PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 2(2); WIS. CONST. art. V, § 3; with ALA. CONST. § 114; ARK. CONST. art.
VI, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. Ill, § 19; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 3; IDAHO
CONST. art. IV, § 2; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3(A); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, ch. 2, §§ 2, art. I; MISS.
CONST. art. V, § 128; MO. CONST. art. V, § 17; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 17; N.C. CONST. art. III, §
2(1); OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. IX, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8; TEX. CONST. art.
IV, § 16(a) (amended 1999); VT. CONST. § 20; VA. CONST. art. V, § 13; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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manner similar to the federal system have provided in their constitutions for
tied-ticket elections. 287  The question is then whether the remaining forty-
four percent of the states who untie their elections demonstrate enough
popular acceptance or even popular demand for changing the
Presidential/Vice Presidential election system to reflect the collective will of
the American people.288 Untying elections may be a more purely democratic
form of selecting leaders, but do the advantages explained by Professor
Friedman and the Amars and recognized by thirty-eight percent of the nation
outweigh the disadvantages described by Professor Goldstein and
recognized by forty-eight percent of the nation? 28 9  Neither camp has
attracted a majority of the states. 290 But unlike the federal election system
where state laws governing ballot design have led to tied-ticket elections, 9
twenty-four states have seen fit to constitutionalize their ticket-tying election
systems.292 Placing such measures in a constitution responds directly to the
idea that citizens are crying out for more options at the ballot box. They are
not. 293 Therefore, the reasonable deduction from this analysis is that there is
no overriding reason such as a popular mandate or trend towards further
287. Twenty-four states with tied-ticket elections for Governor/Lieutenant Governor out of forty-
three total states with the Governor/Lieutenant Governor system.
288. It is indeed possible that nineteen states have the better system. Remember that the Framers
of the original Constitution did not go with the most popular scheme generally when looking at
multiple executive branch organizational schemes, which would have been some type of executive
council over which the President would have presided. See supra note 75. Just because an election
system has a minority of followers does not mean it is the worst system.
289. Nineteen out of fifty states equals thirty-eight percent of the nation; twenty-four out of fifty
states equals forty-eight percent of the nation. See also supra notes 210-37.
290. The trend appears to be heading in the opposite direction from what Professor Friedman and
the Amars would like to see. When the Amars briefly noted which states had tied elections in their
1992 article, there were nineteen states that included tied elections in their constitutions and another
three that tied elections statutorily. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1. Today the three states that tied
their elections statutorily-Alaska, Colorado, and Connecticut-now include tied elections in their
respective constitutions. See supra note 27. Moreover, two new states have now tied their elections
that had not done so in 1992-Kentucky and Nebraska. Supra note 27. Massachusetts appears to be
the only state that has moved toward having untied elections. Supra note 27.
291. Seesupra note 213-17.
292. See supra note 270.
293. That is, for states to constitutionalize a ticket-tying system shows a stronger adherence to the
practice than merely having statutes on the books or agency practices that could be rewritten or
repealed at any time. See supra notes 213-17. This fact gives greater weight to Professor
Goldstein's position-untying the ballots is not a change that is being supported by the majority of
the states, and moreover the states are firmly behind the practice. See Goldstein, Constitutional V.P.,
supra note l, at 554.
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democratization to change the vice presidency again by providing for an
election separate from the President.1
94
B. The States on Additional Duties
A review of the duties of the forty-three state Lieutenant Governor
positions reveals a variety of formal functions and duties assigned to the
second officer of each state whether or not the selection was based on a tied-
ticket or untied-ticket election process.2 95  Sometimes the constitutional
delegation of duties to the Lieutenant Governors is very similar to the
delegation of duties to the Vice President in the Federal Constitution, while
other times it is not at all similar.2 96 The delegation of duties to the
lieutenant governors falls into four nonexclusive categories: 1) Lieutenant
Governor as President of the Senate; 2) duties delegated to the Lieutenant
Governor from the Governor; 3) duties provided by law and by the
constitution, and 4) holding a separate office.297 Some lieutenant governors
fit into multiple categories, while others fit only one category.298
The President of the Senate function is not an anomaly in American
government.299 Just as Article I, Section Three, Clause Four provides that
the Vice President is President of the Senate but may only cast a vote if the
Senate is "equally divided," twenty-four state constitutions provide that
"[t]he Lieutenant Governor is President of the Senate . . . . Multiple
294. There is no sign of a trend toward untying Governor/Lieutenant Governor elections, and in
fact the opposite appears to be true. See supra notes 27, 290. If several states did change their
systems from tied to untied elections, it is possible that the practice would reach a tipping point and
soon a majority of states would have untied elections and there would be increased pressure on the
federal government to implement the changes at least similar to those proposed by Professor
Friedman and the Amars. This is not the reality Professor Friedman and the Amars are arguing
from, however.
295. There appears to be no correlation between whether a Lieutenant Governor is given
expanded or minimal duties and whether he was elected in at tied- or untied-ticket election process.
296. See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text.
297. See infra notes 301-07 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
299. Professor Friedman calls the Vice President's position as "President of the Senate" a "vestige
of no benefit" that "should be eliminated." See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 4; Friedman, supra note 1,
at 1714. However, as this discussion shows, almost half of the states currently have their Lieutenant
Governor acting as President of the Senate (more than half if one only counts the forty-three states
with the Governor/Lieutenant Governor design). See infra note 300. Thus, approximately half of all
Americans do not mind that there is some overlap between the executive and legislative branches.
300. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; ALA. CONST. art. V, § 117; ARK. CONST. amend. VI, § 5;
CAL. CONST. art. V, § 9; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 17; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 19; GA. CONST. art. V,
§ 1, para. 3; IDAHO CONST. art IV, § 13; IND. CONST. art. V, § 21; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 25; MiSS.
CONST. art. V, § 129; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 17; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 8;
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.C. CONST. art. Ill, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 15; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 5; TEX. CONST. art.
IV, § 16(b); VT. CONST. ch. I1, § 19; VA. CONST. art. V, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 16.
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states go beyond the clear and succinct wording of the Federal Constitution,
however, and give additional descriptions of the lieutenant governors'
duties as Senate President.3"' Connecticut, for example, provides that
"when in committee of the whole, [the Lieutenant Governor has] a right to
debate . ,,02 While the language is different from that of the Federal
Constitution, it is not extraordinary; John Adams in his first term set a
precedent for joining in Senate debates and actively making rulings from the
chair.103 This language merely seems to reinforce the idea that the President
of the Senate may indeed act as a presiding officer normally would. Several
state constitutions also provide that the Lieutenant Governor has a right
when the Senate is in committee of the whole not only to join in debate but
"to vote on all subjects" as well as being the casting vote when there is a
tie. 3 4 Other states go further and allow the Lieutenant Governor, "where
there is an equal division in the senate, or on a joint vote of both houses, [to]
give the casting vote.,,305 The Pennsylvania Constitution, on the other hand,
restricts its Lieutenant Governor's vote to any "case of a tie on any question
except the final passage of a bill or [j]oint [r]esolution, the adoption of a
[c]onference [r]eport or the concurrence in amendments made by the House
of Representatives . 3 0 6
Ultimately the distinctions between the Vice President's role as
President of the Senate and the parallel design twenty-four states adopted for
their respective Lieutenant Governors are slight. What Professor Friedman
considers an unnecessary "legislative vestige" in the Federal Government is
replicated by almost half of the fifty states and more than half of the states
with an executive hierarchy similar to the President/Vice President model.30 7
It seems therefore that, whether or not it is a role rarely used in the Federal
Government,3 °1 it is not an anomaly in the greater American system.
301. See CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 17; IND. CONST. art. V, § 21; MISS. CONST. art. V, § 129; Mo.
CONST. art. IV, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 15; PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; TEX. CONST. art. IV, §
16(b); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 16.
302. CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
303. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 23.
304. See IND. CONST. art. V, § 21; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 16(b).
305. See MISS. CONST. art. V, § 129; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
306. See PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
307. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. Twenty-four states give the Lieutenant
Governor employment as President of the State Senate: forty-eight percent of all states and fifty-six
percent of Governor/Lieutenant Governor states. Id.
308. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, On the Presidential Succession, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 475, 479 (1974)
(saying "the Vice President's constitutional employment soon became a farce" when it came to the
President of the Senate duties); Friedman, supra note 1, at 1708 n. 16 ("Garner was the last vice
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Without an overarching reason to do away with the Senate leadership
function of the vice presidency, it seems the American people are content in
keeping the "amphibious" position as it has stood for almost 220 years.30 9
Whether such a reason is present today therefore depends much upon what
other duties the position could be performing in place of being President of
the Senate.
The second category, performing duties delegated by the higher official,
is a function of the second officer that has existed since the earliest days of
the Union, although the Federal Constitution is silent on delegation from the
President to the Vice President. al° History has shown great inconsistency in
the frequency and importance of presidential delegations in the federal
system, however: John Adams played an important role in advising George
Washington;3 1 I Thomas Jefferson felt it against the nature of the vice
presidency to be delegated duties from or to assist the President when he
held the office under John Adams; a 12 for over a century Vice Presidents
were unimportant and unimpressive figureheads who contributed nothing to
the national government; 13 and modem Vice Presidents have been favored
with an increasing number of duties of the highest importance in governing
the nation and forming national and international policy. 1 4 Eighteen states
have expressly provided for delegation of executive duties similar to the
federal system in their constitutions. 15 The typical delegation language is
"[h]e shall perform such duties . . . as may be delegated to him by the
governor, 3 16 but other phrases such as "duties assigned by the governor,"
' 1 7
"executive duties prescribed by the governor,, 31 8 "[t]he lieutenant governor
shall assist the governor,',3' 9 and "duties requested of him by the
president to fulfill the office of Senate president diligently.") (quoting Nelson, Background Paper, in
A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE
PRESIDENCY 33 (1988)).
309. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 122 n.55 (1995). "Amphibious" means that the Vice
President is part of both the executive and the legislative branches in at least some respects. Id.
310. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 147, 149-51 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 187-99 and accompanying text.
315. See ALASKA CONST. art. Ii, § 7; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 3;
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 12; KY. CONST. § 72;
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MD. CONST. art. II, § IA; MICH. CONST. art. V, § 25; MONT. CONST. art.
VI, § 4(2); NEB. CONST. art- IV, § 16; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 10(b); N.C. CONST. art. 111, § 6;
N.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. 1Il, § 01b; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 5; UTAH CONST. art.
VII, § 14.
316. See ALASKA CONST. art. 11I, § 7.
317. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
318. See GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 3.
319. See KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
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governor,"312 0 are also used in various state constitutions. The twenty-five
other state constitutions are silent as to the delegation of executive duties by
the governor to the lieutenant governor.3 2 ' Because the Federal Constitution
is also silent on the point of executive delegation and assignment, the federal
and state practices are not inconsistent with each other, and therefore, all
forty-three states are in line with the federal system and vice versa.322
The third category of duties assigned to the state lieutenant governors,
those provided by law or by the constitutions, essentially supplements the
delegation of duties discussed above.3 23 There is no federal provision in the
Constitution permitting the legislative branch to assign additional duties by
statute to the Vice President;324 the Constitution assigns no duties beyond
succeeding the President when necessary and acting as President of the
Senate. 325  The twenty-one state constitutional provisions that allow for
additional duties of the Lieutenant Governor to be "prescribed by [their]
constitution[s] or by law" therefore go beyond the current federal system and
empower the state legislatures to assign duties other than those expressly
written in the state constitutions.326 Examples of constitutional duties other
than Senate leadership and delegated executive duties are being "member of
the Board of Pardons, 327 being an "ex officio . . . member of each
committee, board, and commission on which the governor serves, 3 28 being
a "member of [the executive] council ' 329 or "council of state, 330 and being
320. See MICH. CONST. art. V, § 25.
321. See generally ALA. CONST.; ARK. CONST.; CAL. CONST.; COLO. CONST.; CONN. CONST.;
DEL. CONST.; HAW. CONST.; IDAHO CONST.; IND. CONST.; MASS. CONST.; MINN. CONST.; MISS.
CONST.; MO. CONST.; NEV. CONST.; N.M. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.; OKLA. CONST.; PA. CONST.; R.I.
CONST.; S.C. CONST.; TENN. CONST.; TEX. CONST.; VT. CONST.; VA. CONST.; WASH. CONST.; WIS.
CONST.
322. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I1.
323. See supra notes 299-322.
324. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
325. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 5, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XXV.
326. See ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 19; FLA.
CONST. art. IV, § 2; GA. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 3; HAW. CONST. art. V, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art IV,
§ 1; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 12; KY. CONST. § 72; LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. 11; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 4; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para.
10(b); N.C. CONST. art. III, § 6; N.D. CONST. art. V, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 01b; OKLA. CONST.
art. VI, § IA; UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 1(2)(c); VT. CONST. § 20; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 16.
327. See DEL. CONST. art. III, § 19.
328. See LA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
329. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. II.
330. See N.C. CONST. art. Il, § 6.
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"Lieutenant-General of all the [military] forces of the state., 331 The possible
extent of duties assigned to the Lieutenant Governor by statute are virtually
limitless provided that they are not inconsistent with the constitution and
duties of the state's governor or other executive branch officials described in
the state constitution. 3 2  This fact coupled with the fact that twenty-one
states (forty-nine percent of those with lieutenant governors) expressly
provide for duties to be given to the state's second-highest officer beyond
those the governor deems to delegate, seems to lean in Professor Friedman's
favor. 333 Thus, many states appear to favor the idea of giving the second-
highest officer more substantive duties in the government rather than leaving
it at the whim of the Governor.334 Furthermore, the three states that have a
331. SeeVT. CONST. § 20.
332. See supra note 176.
333. This is because there are no states balancing the other way; that is, there are no states
restricting the powers of the Lieutenant Governor. Every state that provides for the legislature
assigning duties to the Lieutenant Governor beyond what the governor assigns brings the nation
closer towards a consensus that the second-highest ranking officer should have more and substantive
duties rather than act only at the behest of the top officer. The vice presidency has at least partially
moved in this direction as well, although no constitutional steps have been taken. See supra note
176.
334. There is of course a foreign policy component to the federal executive branch that is not
typically a major factor in state elections and state executive powers. See United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Certain foreign policy concerns are faced by the
President and not any Governors and a unitary executive (one without a Vice President strengthened
with duties beyond what the President deems to delegate) could cause problems in an administration.
See id. Justice Sutherland in Curtiss- Wright detailed the President's foreign policy power as such:
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in origin and
essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the
exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As [future Chief
Justice John] Marshall said [as a U.S. Representative] in his great argument of March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations."
Id. at 319 (internal citation omitted); see also KMIEC ET AL., supra note 11, at 274-75 (quoting
Thomas Jefferson, saying "[t]he transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether.
It belongs then to the head of that department except as to such portion of it as are specially
submitted to the Senate. Arguably, too, exceptions to the theorem are to be construed strictly").
This may be an overriding concern that counterbalances any further movement towards giving the
Vice President more substantive and permanent duties.
The Amars have addressed this concern, however, by speaking to the possibility of a loose
cannon effect:
Internal consistency arguments counsel against a divided executive out of concern over
the damage potentially done by a Vice President acting as a loose cannon--challenging,
undermining, and contradicting the President's efforts to set policy. This concern
distinguishes the federal executive context from that of the states, to some extent, because
a loose cannon would be most dangerous in the foreign affairs domain, where state
executives play no significant part and where the President often does speak in the voice
of the nation. This internal consistency concern, although plausible, does not seem to
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Secretary of State as the first successor to the governor 335 make their second-
highest offices ones with constitutionally or statutorily assigned executive
duties.336 This design also seems to lean in favor of providing Vice
Presidents with their own constitutionally or statutorily assigned executive
duties, but it remains a small minority.
337
The fourth category of executive duties for the second-highest office
directly corresponds with Professor Friedman's idea of allowing the Vice
President to hold a major office in addition to the vice presidency. 338 It turns
out that his idea is not wholly unprecedented in the American system-the
New Jersey Constitution created a Lieutenant Governor who is
constitutionally allowed to be appointed to be the head of a principal
department or state agency in addition to being delegated other
responsibilities by the Governor. 339 The relevant portion of the New Jersey
Constitution reads:
The Governor shall appoint the Lieutenant Governor to serve as the
head of a principal department or other executive or administrative
justify the prohibition on ticket splitting.
Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 938. Indeed, they provide several examples of past loose cannons in
administrations with a President and a Vice President of the same party:
Aaron Burr is, ironically, a good example. As one commentator put it, President
"Jefferson ignored Burr on all matters of state and even in questions of patronage
involving Burr's home state of New York. As presiding officer of the Senate, Burr made
clear he was not Jefferson's agent, breaking one tie vote against an administration bill."
Burr is by no means the only example. Both Franklin Roosevelt's first and second Vice
Presidents, John Garner and Henry Wallace, were often at odds with the policies of the
President they purported to serve.
Id. at 938 n.73 (internal citations omitted). Additionally "[tihere was little continuity when Vice
Presidents John Tyler, Andrew Johnson, and Theodore Roosevelt replaced Presidents who died in
office." Id. at 939 n.76.
335. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § IA (Secretary of State); OR. CONST. art. V, § 8a (Secretary of State);
WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (Secretary of State).
336. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 9 ("The powers and duties of Secretary of State ... shall be as
prescribed by law"); OR. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("The Secretary of State shall keep a fair record of the
official acts of the Legislative Assembly, and Executive Department of the State; and shall when
required lay the same, and all matters relative thereto before either branch of the Legislative
Assembly. He shall be by virture of his office, Auditor of public Accounts, and shall perform such
other duties as shall be assigned him by law."); WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 12 ("The powers and duties
of the secretary of state ... shall be as prescribed by law .... ").
337. This design actually appears to give the greatest backing to the idea of enhancing duties
delegated from the President to the Vice President with additional constitutional or statutory duties.
Beyond being made a member of the National Security Counsel, the Vice President's duties continue
to depend on the decisions of individual Presidents. See supra notes 176, 187-199.
338. See supra notes 239-50.
339. N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 10(b).
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agency of State government, or delegate to the Lieutenant Governor
duties of the office of Governor, or both. The Governor shall not
appoint the Lieutenant Governor to serve as Attorney General. The
Lieutenant Governor shall in addition perform such other duties as
may be provided by law .... Each principal department shall be
under the supervision of the Governor. The head of each principal
department shall be a single executive unless otherwise provided by
law. Such single executives shall be nominated and appointed by
the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at
the pleasure of the governor .... The Governor may appoint the
Lieutenant Governor to serve as the head of a principal department,
without the advice and consent of the Senate, and to serve at the
pleasure of the Governor during the Governor's term of office.340
Perhaps this description of the Lieutenant Governor's role in the
executive branch of one state government is close to what Professor
Friedman had in mind for the Vice President's role in the Executive Branch
of the Federal Government.341
On the negative side for Professor Friedman, there is only one state that
has seen fit to permit the Governor to appoint the Lieutenant Governor to the
head of a principle department or administrative agency in the state.342
Additionally, New Jersey does not assign the Lieutenant Governor the role
of President of the Senate, a role which may cause problems if the vice
presidency were changed to follow either New Jersey's design or Professor
Friedman's design. 43 On the positive side for Professor Friedman, there is
at least one precedent for this Executive Branch organizational scheme, and,
moreover, New Jersey felt it prudent to eliminate the advice and consent
function of the Senate when the Governor appointed the Lieutenant
Governor as a principle department or agency head.3 "
340. See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 10(b); art. V, § 4, para. 2.
341. Professor Friedman did not mention the New Jersey Constitution or governmental design
when discussing his proposal for giving the Vice President additional duties. See generally
Friedman, supra note 1.
342. See N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, par. 10(b); art. V, § 4, para. 2.
343. Professor Friedman already believes, however, that the "legislative vestige" should be
eliminated. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1714. Whether any benefits would accrue from
eliminating the President of the Senate function remains an open question, but Friedman argues that
"[w]ithout the vice-president, the Senate would simply select its own presiding officer, as does the
House. On tie votes, the proposal would fail, as it does in the House. And the Republic would
survive." Id. at 1714 n.43. Friedman also claims that "harm would arise if the vice-president's
function in the Senate were held or feared to be a constitutional obstacle to the vice-president's
ability to hold other political office." Id. at 1714 n.44. But whether it would be an improvement for
the Vice President to hold an additional office remains uncertain. See supra notes 251-55 and
accompanying text.
344. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 10(b); art. V, § 4,
para. 2. This precedent would take away some of the political drawbacks Professor Friedman
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Presently there is little reason the Federal Constitution should follow the
trail-blazing State of New Jersey and provide for vice presidential
appointment to a separate, major position within the Executive Branch, but
at least there is now a state to watch and examine for such a change in the
future. In the spirit of states as laboratories of experiment, it is imperative
that Professor Friedman follow with close interest the success (or failure) of
the New Jersey system and re-propose his idea for change sometime in the
future with additional evidence to support his theory. Perhaps other states
will see the success of New Jersey's Lieutenant Governor and create the
same or similar designs to their executive branch structure, thereby giving
extra weight to Professor Friedman's proposal, creating movement towards a
national tipping point. That time is not yet here, however.
C. The Results of this Methodology
After applying this state constitution-based methodology, the results are
in. As to having a separate election for Vice President, the evidence presents
no compelling reason to change from the system that is currently in place.345
The nation as a whole is neither crying out for separate elections nor even
much bothered by a slight lack of pure electoral choice.346 More than half of
the states with a Governor/Lieutenant Governor system that parallels the
federal system tie their elections and do so in the most permanent fashion
possible-constitutionally.347  The modem rise of the vice presidency has
taken the office from the mire that it wallowed in for many decades and has
placed it on a pedestal where it is polished and praised with increasing
enthusiasm. Without a more dramatic state trend toward untied elections,
many of the second-highest office's flaws seem to be things of the past-
more able men and women are being attracted to and elected for the
office; 3 48 Vice Presidents are being given more and more trust and
recognized and Professor Goldstein cited as problems with appointing the Vice President to a
separate executive office. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 1716-19; Goldstein, Constitutional V.P.,
supra note 1, at 556-57.
345. Ultimately, the principles of democracy seem to be operating fine, both nationally and in the
several states, and the abilities of recent Vice Presidents are continuing to bring vigor and prestige to
the formerly despised second office. See supra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
346. The Amars' argument against "inertia" is only a strong argument if there are substantial
benefits to be gained from a proposed change. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 942-44. Any
major change to a constitutional institution such as the vice presidency without a compelling reason
would be as equally "stupid" and "blind" as not changing because of simple inertia. See id.
347. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
348. Compare supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text, with supra notes 187-199 and
accompanying text.
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responsibilities in their administrations;349 and the jokes and criticisms have
turned from being based on uselessness and scorn to being based on too
much influence and power.350 The states, therefore, do not offer any
compelling reason to change the present common law development of the
office commended by Professor Goldstein in favor of the more formal and
active changes proposed by Professor Friedman and the Amars.
The second proposal-giving the Vice President the more formal duties
of a Cabinet officer or similar post to supplement the constitutional duties of
Senate President and succession-appeared to have more promise on its
face. Many state constitutions expressly provide for the delegation of duties
to the second-highest office from the Chief Executive.351 This goes beyond
the Federal Constitution's language, but is not a novel idea because in
practice the vice presidency has been increasingly favored with choice
executive assignments delegated by the President.352 Adding language
similar to the state constitutions would seem superfluous. Even more states
provide specifically for the legislature imparting additional duties in the
constitution or by statute on the state's second officer.353 This has occurred
at least once in the federal system when the Vice President became a
statutory member of the National Security Counsel, 35 4 but going further
would seem to violate the separation of powers principle, 355 and may not
translate well between the plural state systems with multiple popularly
elected executive officers and the unitary federal executive model.
35 6
Finally, as to the specific proposal of appointing the Vice President to a
Cabinet-level post in addition to his constitutional duties, there is just not
enough precedent to rely upon for a President to implement such a
change.35 7 While New Jersey has written into its constitution a design
similar to Professor Friedman's proposal, there is no evidence at this time of
its successes or failures. 311 In time, perhaps, this model will prove to be a
349. See supra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
350. Compare supra note 126, with supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 187-199 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 175.
355. If Congress started assigning duties to the Vice President, an officer who historically has
only performed duties as delegated by the President, there may erupt a constitutional battle over the
vice presidency (which may or may not be a positive thing).
356. Many states have multiple executive officers who are popularly elected beyond the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor. See, e.g., supra note 266. The federal government only has two: the
President and the Vice President, with the President receiving all of the delegated executive power.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1; art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
357. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text, and text following note 44.
358. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text, and text following note 44.
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better system for preparing future Vice Presidents for succession, but that
time has yet to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the grand scheme of things, the form and structure of the American
vice presidency pops up on people's radars, perhaps, once every four years,
if they follow the Presidential election cycles and the news media devotes
any amount of time to it. There is, therefore, no better time than the present
to bring to the public's collective attention any issues regarding the nation's
second-highest office, as the 2008 election cycle is fast approaching. It is a
particularly appropriate time to examine the role the Vice President takes in
governing the American polity because President George W. Bush is
constitutionally ineligible for another term, 359 and Vice President Dick
Cheney claims to have no political ambitions beyond his present term,36 °
meaning it is almost a certainty there will be a new Vice President sworn in
at noon on January 20, 2009.36 But performing a careful public
examination of the office does not require that any imperfections that are
found be remedied immediately. Remember, the Constitution is nearing its
two hundred twentieth birthday and yet it remains very similar to its original
form. 362 Edward R. Murrow explained this point nicely:
The American system of government is revered by its people,
admired by its foreign friends, respected by most of its opponents,
and understood in its entirety by only a few specialists, who,
however, do not always agree about it. As an organism it is
complex and often obscure. Not unlike the organism of the body,
its strengths and its weaknesses are not always easy to account for.
The fact that the system has survived so long in a changing world,
and seems likely to go on surviving, certainly proves that it is
viable, and what has been said about the wisdom shown in devising
it is justified. To be sure, part of the wisdom was to allow the
359. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (limiting Presidents to two terms).
360. See Walsh et al., supra note 196, at 40 (reporting that Cheney "has no plans to run for the top
job himself').
361. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § I ("The terms of the President and Vice President shall end
at noon on the 20th day of January... and the terms of their successors shall then begin.").
362. With only twenty-seven amendments in almost 220 years (ten coming immediately), there
has been relatively little change to the Federal Constitution since its ratification. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I-XXVII. Discounting the Bill of Rights, the Constitution has been amended less than once
per decade, on average.
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system to be adapted to new conditions. The Constitution has been
drastically modified, and in many other ways the present form of
government departs from the original design of the Constitutional
Convention. But modem America differs still more from colonial
America which had just won its independence, so the original plan
had plenty of merit. 363
With this in mind, it behooves anyone who champions any major
changes through either constitutional amendment or executive policy to
reflect first upon the magnitude of the imperfection, second upon the
magnitude of the change suggested, and finally upon the popular outcry of
the American public for or against change. This Article has attempted to do
just that.
Ultimately, today's vice presidency is not the office it was in 1787,
1887, or even 1987. It has undergone perhaps more reconstructive surgery
and rehabilitation than any area of the Federal Constitution, and it looks
better than it ever has. It has relied upon gradual common law changes since
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967, and there appears to be no reason for
it to depart from the successful path it has finally found. Other scholars have
suggested reasons for change and against change, and this Article now
confirms that the American people, as represented through their state
constitutions, see no reason for further active change. And especially with
the American system of dual sovereignties, it is almost always appropriate to
examine the states when examining the federal government. Why? Because
they have been the best guides since 1787.
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